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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial was correct in ruling that West Daniels Land Association 
breached its fiduciary duties to Ray Okelberry where the Association chose to lease 
Association-owned land to a non-shareholder. 
The issue of whether a corporation has breached its fiduciary duties presents a 
mixed question of law and fact for which trial court is granted "ample" and "broad* 
discretion. C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc.? 896 P.2d 47, 53 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that provisions in the bylaws 
requiring members of the West Daniels Land Association to own valid grazing permits 
from the Forest Service conflicted with the Articles of Incorporation. 
Under Utah law, articles of incorporation and bylaws of a corporation are 
treated as contracts between the member and the corporation. Turner v. Hi-Country 
Homeowners Ass'n. 910 P.2d 1223,1225 (Utah 1996). The issue of whether a trial 
court erred in interpreting a contract presents a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness. See Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, f 16, 30 P.3d 436. This issue was 
preserved below at R. 291. 
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All other issues and standards of review as presented in West Daniels' opening 
brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(1). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in relevant part 
that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of Facts 
In 1952, a group of cattlemen and ranchers banded together to form the West 
Daniels Land Association (West Daniels). (See Attachment A). Under the Articles of 
Incorporation that were enacted at that time, West Daniels was to "exist for ninety-
nine years from the date of incorporation for the purpose to hold and own and 
manage grazing land for the purpose of grazing animals as shall be determined by the 
board of directors of said corporation.55 (Attachment A) (Emphasis added.). 
Pursuant to its corporate charter, West Daniels eventually acquired 
approximately 5200 acres on which its individual members were allowed to graze their 
cattle. (Attachment B, Findings at f7). That land was used as a spring/fall range. 
(Attachment B, Findings at f8). During the summers, members of West Daniels 
moved their cattle onto neighboring lands that were owned by the United States 
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Forest Service; use of those lands, however, required the individuals to acquire grazing 
permits. (Attachment B, Findings at 117-8). 
In accordance with West Daniels' livestock-centered purpose, the Articles of 
Incorporation (the Articles) expressly linked ownership of the shares of stock in West 
Daniels to ownership of grazing-capable livestock. The Articles thus provided that 
"two shares [of stock] shall be issued for each head of livestock." (Attachment A). At 
the close of the Articles, a table was included listing the respective number of shares 
owned by each of the founding members. (Attachment A). The Articles also set forth 
some initial procedures that were to be followed vis a vis membership and voting in 
the Association. Specifically, the Articles stated that "each share of stock may cast one 
vote" in Association meetings, and that "[n]ew members shall be received by a 
majority vote of the stockholders present at a duly called meeting." (Attachment A). 
West Daniels also adopted Bylaws to further clarify and govern its corporate 
affairs. (Attachment C).1 Under the terms of Article III of the Bylaws, membership in 
West Daniels was now limited to persons who qualified as "permittee member[s] of the 
Association." In order to become a permittee member, one had to show that he or she 
held "a permit to graze cattle on the West Daniels Cattle Association Range." 
(Attachment C). Under Article IV of the Bylaws, service as an officer or member of 
1
 At trial, there was some discussion as to whether the Bylaws were properly 
adopted. After hearing the evidence, the trial court determined that the Bylaws were in 
fact properly adopted and were thus binding. (Attachment B, Findings at %). West 
Daniels has not challenged that ruling. 
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the board of directors of West Daniels was also limited to those who held permits to 
graze on Forest Service land. (Attachment C). 
On April 28, 1999, Ray Okelberry (Okelberry), a cattle rancher who was at that 
time the president of West Daniels, filed a verified complaint against the corporation, 
alleging various claims arising out of disputes over corporate voting rights and 
property decisions. (R. at 36). 
In February 2002, the board of West Daniels met and decided to lease the land 
that had previously been used by the shareholders for their grazing out to the highest 
bidder. (Attachment B, Findings at f 15). The Board then advertised the property for 
lease in "several periodicals, local periodicals, and statewide periodicals," (R. 569 at 
143-44), and, after receiving a high bid, decided to lease out the grazing rights to a non-
shareholder. When later asked about his opinion of the decision to lease that land to a 
non-shareholder, Okelberry stated that he was "outraged at it." (R. 569 at p.87). 
When asked why he didn't simply bid for the right to lease that land, he indicated that 
there were two reasons for his failure to do so. First, Okelberry stated that because he 
"was already a member of the corporation," he thought that he already "had a right to 
use it" without having to pay any extra money. (R. 569 at p.92). Second, Okelberry 
also testified that he wasn't even initially aware that the board of directors had taken 
the step of advertising the land out to prospective leaseholders. (R. 569 at p.90). 
Instead, Okelberry testified that he had thought that the corporation was simply 
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studying the issue, (R. 569 at p.90), and that when he learned that the corporation had 
actually chosen to lease the land out, he immediately objected. (R. 569 at p.91). 
An amended complaint was filed on January 19, 2001. (R. at 347; Attachment 
D). In his amended complaint, Okelberry asked for relief based on two separate causes 
of action. In his first cause of action, Okelberry asked for declaratory relief. As part 
of the declaratory relief claim, Okelberry first alleged that certain members of West 
Daniels had lost their Forest Service permits. Insofar as shares in West Daniels had 
been conditioned on the ownership of those permits, Okelberry asked the court to 
declare that the shares of those members who no longer had valid permits should 
accordingly be transferred to permit-owning members. (Attachment D at Iff 21-32). 
In paragraph 33 of the declaratory relief claim, Okelberry also included an allegation 
that properties owned by West Daniels were owned collectively, and that, as such, use 
of those properties must be open to all members. (Attachment D at 1 33). 
In his second cause of action, Okelberry asked for relief based on a violation of 
his contractual rights. Specifically, Okelberry alleged that his membership in West 
Daniels gave him a contractual right to use the West Daniels land for the grazing of his 
livestock, that certain decisions of the West Daniels leadership had deprived him of 
that right, and that he had thus incurred compensable damages as a result of those 
decisions. (Attachment D at 1134-40). 
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On May 21, 2001, the trial court dismissed Okelberry's claim that membership 
in West Daniels should be limited to those who own valid grazing permits. (R. at 399; 
Attachment E at pp. 4-5). The trial court held that those provisions of the Bylaws that 
required ownership of grazing permits were in conflict with the Articles, and therefore 
struck them as invalid. (Attachment E at pp. 4-5). In that same ruling, however, the 
trial court expressly held that Okelberry was entitled to a trial on (i) his request for a 
declaratory ruling that he was entitled to use of West Daniels property for grazing and 
(ii) his request for damages stemming from the alleged breach of his contractual rights 
with respect to that land. (Attachment E at pp. 5-6). 
A bench trial was held on these claims on July 22-23, 2002. (R. at 503). At the 
conclusion of the trial, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. at 
503; Attachment B). In those findings, the trial court found that the purpose of West 
Daniels is to "provide grazing lands for the livestock owned by the shareholders." 
(Attachment B, Findings at 1[16) (Emphasis added.). The court further determined that 
West Daniels had breached its fiduciary duties to Okelberry by leasing its 5200 acres of 
land to a non-member bidder, (Attachment B, Findings at t115-16), and that 
Okelberry was entitled to damages as a result. (Attachment B, Findings at H119-24). 
On April 30, 2003, West Daniels filed notice of appeal. On May 13, 2003, 
Okelberry filed a notice of cross-appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reject West Daniels' arguments relating to its breach of its 
fiduciary duties. This Court should instead hold: (A) that the business judgment rule 
does not protect West Daniels' decision to lease its land to non-members because this 
decision was not authorized under the corporate charter; (B) that West Daniels' 
obligations with respect to the property were appropriately considered under Rule 
54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and (C) that the trial court did not err by 
refusing to require Okelberry to comply with the requirements for filing a derivative 
action. 
Additionally, this Court should hold that Judge Schofield erred in dismissing 
Okelberry's declaratory judgment claims. This Court should instead hold that 
Okelberry was entitled to a trial on the issues raised in the claim relating to the proper 
preconditions for stock ownership. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT WEST DANIELS 
BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES BY LEASING ITS LAND TO 
NON-SHAREHOLDERS. 
In awarding damages to Okelberry, the trial court found that West Daniels had 
breached its fiduciary duties to him by leasing its land to a non-member. West Daniels 
now attacks that ruling, arguing that (A) the decision to lease the land was protected 
by the business judgment rule, (B) the decision to lease the land was not properly 
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before the court, and (C) that any effort by Okelberry to sue for a breach of those 
fiduciary duties should have been subjected to the requirements for filing a derivative 
action. Each of these arguments should be rejected by this Court. 
A. THE DECISION TO LEASE THE LAND TO NON-
SHAREHOLDERS WAS NOT PROTECTED BY THE BUSINESS 
JUDGMENT RULE. 
West Daniels first argues that the decision to lease West Daniels land was 
protected by the business judgment rule and therefore not subject to judicial scrutiny. 
According to West Daniels, Utah Code Annotated section 16-6a-822(6) (2004) acts as a 
codification of the business judgment rule, wherein decisions of a nonprofit 
corporation's board of directors are not reviewable absent a showing of willful 
misconduct or intentional infliction of harm on the corporation. 
This argument should be rejected, however, for three separate reasons. First, by 
its express terms, section 16-6a-822(6) only applies where a claimant seeks to hold a 
director personally liable for decisions that were made in the director's corporate 
capacity. Because the claims in this case do not seek such liability, section 16-6a-822(6) 
is simply inapplicable. Second, the fact that section 16-6a-822(6) has been referred to as 
a codification of the "business judgment rule" does not bring this claim within its 
purview. Third, although it is well-settled that although corporate decisions are 
typically given a certain degree of deference, that deference is limited where the 
corporate decision was not authorized under the corporate charter. 
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1. By its express terms, Utah Code Annotated Section 16-6a-822(6) 
simply does not require a showing of willful misconduct or 
intentional infliction of harm where the claim is made against a 
corporation, rather than against directors in their individual 
capacities. 
"When interpreting statutes, we look first to the plain language." Diener v. 
Diener, 2004 UT App 314 ,110, 98 P.3d 1178 (quotations and citation omitted). 
"When interpreting the plain language of a statute, we assume that each term in the 
statute was used advisedly; thus, the statutory words are read literally, unless such a 
reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Florida Asset Fin. Corp. v. Utah 
Labor Comm'n, 2004 UT App 273,110, 98 P.3d 436 (quotations and citation omitted). 
Under the terms of section 16-6a-822(6), it is true that, in some circumstances, a 
plaintiff cannot hold a defendant liable for a breach of fiduciary duties absent a 
showing of "wilful misconduct" or "intentional infliction of harm." By its express 
statutory terms, however, that heightened standard is only applicable in certain 
instances. Specifically, subsection 16-6a-822(6) states that 
[a] director or officer is not liable to the nonprofit corporation [or] its members 
. . . for any action taken, or any failure to take any action, as an officer or 
director, as the case may be, unless: 
(a) the director or officer has breached or failed to perform the duties of 
the office as set forth in this section; and 
(b) the breach or failure to perform constitutes: 
(i) willful misconduct; or 
(ii) intentional infliction of harm on: 
(A) the nonprofit corporation; or 
(B) the members of the nonprofit corporation. 
(Emphasis added.). 
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As is indicated in the emphasized language, the willful misconduct/intentional 
infliction of harm requirement is only operative when the claim seeks to hold a 
director or officer personally liable for actions that were taken in his or her capacity as 
a corporate officer. There is no language anywhere in this statute, however, that 
would apply this same stringent standard of review to claims that are made against the 
corporation generally. 
An examination of the two cases cited by West Daniels supports this 
conclusion. West Daniels first cites C & Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, 896 P.2d 47 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), wherein the corporation itself was the plaintiff, and where its 
claim was that two of its former directors should have been held individually liable for 
alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties. See id at 53-55. West Daniels next cites 
Reedeker v. Salisbury. 952 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), which also involved a claim 
that "several past and present trustees and officers" should have been held "personally 
liable" for their alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. Reedeker. 952 P.2d at 581 
(emphasis added). Neither of these cases involved situations where the heightened 
standard of section 16-6a-822(6) was applied to a corporation, as opposed to its 
individual directors, and neither of these cases in any way purported to extend that 
standard to such cases in the future. Aside from these two cases, West Daniels has 
cited no other authority that would support such an extension. 
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In the present case, it is true that the amended complaint did list several 
members of the board as individual defendants. (See Attachment D). The stated reason 
for this, however, was not to hold those members "liable'5 for any decision that was 
made in their capacities as officers, but rather to simply obtain a declaratory 
adjudication as to their ability as individual shareholders to actually hold stock in the 
corporation. (See Attachment D at ^21-32). Paragraph 25 of the Amended 
Complaint thus specifically stated that the claim against the "individually listed 
defendants" was based on those members' *claim[s] to hold shares of membership in 
the Association." By contrast, the request for monetary damages was only made in the 
context of the breach of contract claim, which (i) was expressly predicated on a claim 
against West Daniels as a corporation, and (ii) did not at any point ask for relief from 
any individual board member. (See Attachment D at 11 34-40). 
Under Utah law, "statutory rights may not be enlarged . . . unless the Act 
expressly states such a right." Snow Flower Homeowners Ass'n v. Snow Flower. Ltd.. 
2001 UT App 207,124, 31 P.3d 576. Here, because the plain language of 16-6a-822(6) 
limits its applicability to claims that are made against the corporation generally, an 
extension of the willful misconduct/intentional infliction of harm standard to this case 
would simply be unwarranted in the absence of any statutory authority to the 
contrary. As such, West Daniels' claim that Okelberry was required to establish that 
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the West Daniels board had acted with willful misconduct or intentional infliction of 
harm is simply unsupported under Utah law, and should therefore be rejected.2 
2. The fact that section 16-6a-822 has been referred to as a 
codification of the "business judgment rule" does not mean that 
the corporate decision itself is subject to the same degree of 
scrutiny that is applied to a claim against an individual corporate 
director. 
As noted by West Daniels, some Utah courts have stated that section 16-6a-822fs 
parallel statutes or prior incarnations act as codifications of the "business judgment 
rule." See, e.g., C & Y Corp.. 896 P.2d at 55. Contrary to West Daniels' assertions, 
however, the fact that section 16-6a-822 has been referred to as "the business judgment 
rule" does not mean that its heightened standard applies to judicial review of a 
corporation's business decisions. 
Academic commentators that have examined the business judgment rule have 
concluded that there is no one formulation of the rule or its scope. One commentator 
concluded that the rule is a "multi-faceted one" that has multiple iterations across the 
country. Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn't a Rule-The Business Judgment 
Rule. 36 Val. U. L. Rev. 631, 632 (2002). Another commentator argued that "despite 
all of the attention lavished on it, the business judgment rule remains poorly 
understood," and there is not a "coherent and unified theory that explains" its proper 
2In its brief, West Daniels has also asserted that the trial court's failure to enter 
findings of wilful misconduct or intentional harm was reversible error. Because this 
standard was inapplicable to these specific claims, this Court should now reject that 
argument as well. 
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application. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention 
Doctrine, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 83, 84 (2004). In general terms, however, the 
commentators have identified two separate strains of the rule, each with its own 
purpose, history, and legal standard. 
In the first strain, the business judgment rule has traditionally been applied as a 
means of preventing courts from unduly meddling with the business decisions of a 
corporate board. Explaining this strain, one commentator argued that the rule is best 
understood as "a doctrine of abstention pursuant to which courts in fact refrain from 
reviewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions for review are satisfied." Id. at 
87. This strain recognizes "the need to preserve the board of directors' decision-
making discretion," idL at 84, and thus "recognizes the legitimacy of the board as a 
decision maker and the substantial judicial deference to be accorded thereto." Joseph 
Hinsey, Business Judgment &: the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance 
Project, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 609, 612 (1984). 
This classical strain was applied in the famous Shlensky v. Wrigley decision, 
wherein the Illinois Court of Appeals refused to intervene in the intra-corporate 
dispute as to whether the owners of the Chicago Cubs should begin playing night 
games. See generally Shlensky v. Wrigley. 237 N.E.2d 776 (111. App. Ct. 1968). In 
Utah, this strain of the business judgment rule has been applied in such cases as 
Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co.. 47 P.2d 1054 (Utah 1935), wherein the court held that 
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"[i]t is the duty of the courts to determine whether or not the directors have acted in 
good faith with their corporation. If so, then it is the duty of the courts to uphold the 
actions of the directors, even though it may appear that the things done were in fact 
not advantageous to the corporation.'5 kL at 1064; see also Summit Range & Livestock 
Co. v. Rees. 265 P.2d 381, 382 (Utah 1953). 
By contrast, the modern approach to the business judgment rule instead focuses 
on the situations in which a corporation's directors should be subjected to individual 
liability for their participation in corporate decisions. See Bainbridge, 57 Vand. L. 
Rev. at 90 ("The modern trend is to treat the business judgment rule as a substantive 
standard of liability.55). Rather than focusing on the board's ability to make a 
particular decision, this modern strain instead focuses on whether an individual 
director can be held liable for a decision's adverse consequences. See also Kenneth B. 
Davis, Once More. The Business Judgment Rule. 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 573, 587-88 (2000); 
Hinsey, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 611-13. It is within this framework that such 
decisions as C & Y Corp. and Reedeker (the two decisions cited by West Daniels in its 
brief) are more properly understood. 
Though undeniably related, it is clear that these two strains of the business 
judgment rule are in fact distinct-not only in purpose and scope, but also often distinct 
in the precise legal standards that govern their application. See Bainbridge, 57 Vand. L. 
Rev. at 87 ("Because the two conceptions contemplate dramatically different 
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approaches to judicial review, the choice between them can have outcome-
determinative effects.55). While the decision-protective strain of the business judgment 
rule simply seeks to allow corporations the freedom to take calculated business risks, 
for example, the director-protective strain is more specifically designed to ensure that 
qualified individuals do not feel the need to refrain from corporate service as the result 
of potential legal liabilities. See Davis, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. at 573-75; see also, 
Bainbridge, 57 Vand. L. Rev. at 87-89; Hinsey, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 611-12. 
For purposes of this case, two principles are thus important. First, the 
differences in purpose between these two formulations are such that the courts and 
statutes have often created different standards to govern their application. See, e.g.T 
Gries Sports Enters, Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 959, 964-
65 (Ohio 1986); Davis, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. at 588 (stating that, given the relative 
purposes, courts "need not be as protective" of a corporation's decisions as they are of 
individual directors). Second, given these differences, it is important to recognize there 
are in fact also situations where it has been found entirely appropriate for a court to 
review the substance of a corporation's decision, while still protecting the corporate 
directors from individual liability. See Hinsey, 52 Geo Wash. L. Rev. at 613. 
Returning to the case at hand, the ultimate problem with West Daniels' 
argument is that it presupposes that just because Utah has statutorily created a 
heightened willful misconduct/intentional infliction of harm standard to govern 
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director liability cases, that that same heightened standard should also be applied to 
cases where the court is instead only examining the propriety of the corporate decision 
itself. Had the Legislature intended such a result, it certainly could have written 
language into section 16-6a-822 that would have been broad enough to bring such 
corporate decisions within its purview. It did not do so, however, instead choosing 
only to provide that extra statutory protection to cases in which the claim seeks to 
hold the directors personally liable. 
Because of the differences between these two types of situations, this Court 
simply cannot assume that the Legislature intended to shield corporate decisions with 
the same degree of protection that is afforded to corporate directors. As such, the fact 
that section 16-6a-822 has been referred to as a "business judgment rule" codification 
simply does not mean that its own heightened standard is in any applicable to this 
case. 
3, The decision to lease the land to non-shareholders was an ultra-
vires act that is not protected by the business judgment rule. 
As discussed above, corporate decisions are generally protected from judicial 
review under Utah law as long as the directors acted in "good faith," Chapman, 47 
P.2d at 1064, or as long as the actions are not "fraudulent or so discriminatory as to be 
confiscatory of the rights of the defendant." Summit Range &; Livestock Co. v. Rees, 
265 P.2d 381, 382 (Utah 1953). In so holding, however, Utah law also recognizes that 
the protection that is generally afforded to corporate decisions does not apply where 
PAGE 16 OF 40 
the corporate decision is not authorized by the corporate charter. In Summit Range & 
Livestock Co., for example, the Utah Supreme Court held that a corporate action 
"will not be interfered with so long as it is within the framework of the purposes and 
powers included in the corporate charter." Id. (emphasis added). 
This rule has been consistently applied by other courts that have examined 
similar questions. The editors of American Jurisprudence thus state as a general rule 
that "[g]rounds for court interference may arise where the action of the board of 
directors is an abuse of discretion, forbidden by statute, against public policy or ultra 
vires." 18B Am.Jur.2d Corporations §1296 (emphasis added); cL Black's Law 
Dictionary, Ultra Vires (8th ed. 2004) (defining "ultra vires" acts as acts that are 
"[unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by the corporate 
charter or by law").3 
In accordance with this principle, one federal district court has recently noted 
that while "the business judgment rule [] generally insulates decisions made by a 
corporation's board of directors from judicial review absent a showing that the 
corporate officers acted in bad faith," "a decision by directors that. . . ultra vires 
importantly, this limitation on the application of the business judgment rule also 
extends to situations where the claim seeks liability from an individual director, rather 
than just review of the corporate decision. See 18B Am.Jur.2d Corporations §1473 ("The 
privilege of a corporate officer to use his or her discretion in acting on behalf of a 
corporation ceases to exist if the corporate officer acts outside the scope of his or her 
corporate authority A director is not required to have intentionally acted to harm the 
corporation, in order to be liable for breach of the duty to exercise appropriate attention 
to potentially illegal corporate activities."). 
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conduct would serve the best interests of the corporation is not protected by the 
business judgment rule." Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat'l Convertible Sec. Fund, Inc., 140 
F.Supp. 424, 437 (E.D. Penn. 2001), vacated on other grounds by 2003 WL 1846095. 
The New Jersey Court of Appeals similarly held that "the first question in any . . . 
dispute [between shareholders and corporate officers] is whether the board's action 
was ultra vires." Verna v. Links at Valleybrook Neighborhood Ass'n. Inc., 852 A.2d 
202, 211 (N.J. App. 2004). Examining the issue in that case, the Verna court held that 
because the [disputed corporate action] was ultra vires, the board's 
conduct cannot be shielded by the 'business judgment' rule, which 
applies only when a board has the authority to make such a decision. 
Only when a board's actions are authorized and of the type that justify 
application of the 'business judgment' rule, will a court refrain from 
second-guessing its actions. 
Id. at 212 (emphasis added). This rule has also been consistently applied by various 
other courts that have examined the issue. See, e.g.. Paglin v. Saztec Int'L Inc., 834 
F.Supp. 1184, 1200 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (holding that "the business judgment rule does 
not apply when the act complained of is ultra vires"); Moran v. Household Int'L Inc.. 
500 A.2d 1346, 1350 p e l . 1985) ("Of course, the business judgment rule can only 
sustain corporate decision making or transactions that are within the power or 
authority of the Board."); Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Ass'n. 538 S.E.2d 15, 25 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2001) (holding that "the business judgment rule applies to intra vires action of 
corporation, not to ultra vires acts") (quoting Seabrook Island Property Owners Ass'n 
v. Pelzer. 356 S.E.2d 411 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987)). 
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Turning to the case at hand, it is true that Utah law generally grants nonprofit 
corporations the power to sell land. As noted by West Daniels, section 16-6a-302 of 
the Utah Code does state that such corporations do have the power to "purchase, 
receive, lease, or otherwise acquire" land. Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-302(2)(d) (2004). 
This power, however, is necessarily circumscribed by "the purposes and powers 
included in the corporate charter." Summit Range & Livestock Co., 265 P.2d at 382. 
Indeed, this limitation is implicitly recognized in the first sentence of § 16-6a-302 itself, 
which states that a nonprofit corporation has the enumerated powers "[ujnless its 
articles of incorporation provide otherwise." Subsection 16-6a-302(2) similarly states 
that the corporation's otherwise unlimited power to "do all things necessary or 
convenient" is only operative where that activity is a "permitted activit[y]" for that 
particular corporation. 
Here, after hearing the testimony and evidence at trial, the trial court entered a 
finding of fact stating that "the purpose of the corporation as set forth in the Affidavit 
is to obtain lands for grazing purposes to assist in helping its members." (Attachment 
B, Findings at J2) (emphasis added). The court also entered a finding of fact stating 
that the founders of the corporation "anticipated that the shareholders would put their 
livestock on the land to be acquired by the Association." (Attachment B, Findings at 
53). The court further found that the board of West Daniels chose to lease out its 5200 
acres of land in 2002 to "the highest bidder," regardless of whether that bidder was a 
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member of the corporation. (Attachment B, Findings at 115). Tying these findings 
together, the court thus concluded that this decision violated the corporation's 
fiduciary duties because it was not within the apurpose[s] of the corporation, which 
the Court has previously ruled is to provide grazing lands for the livestock owned by 
the shareholders." (Attachment B, Findings at f 16) (emphases added).4 
Notably, West Daniels has not challenged the Court's specific factual finding 
that the purpose of the corporation was to "provide grazing lands for the livestock 
owned by the shareholders/' (emphasis added), nor has it challenged the court's 
finding that, as part of the corporate purpose, it was "anticipated that the shareholders 
would put their livestock on the land to be acquired by the Association." As findings 
of fact, such challenges would necessarily have involved a marshaling of the supporting 
evidence, see Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); in the absence of such a challenge or of 
marshaling, this Court is therefore obligated to assume that the evidence does in fact 
support these findings. See Johnson v. Higley. 1999 UT App 278,137, 989 P.2d 61. 
As such, this Court is now left with the task of reviewing the trial court's 
determination that the decision to lease its land to a non-member (or, alternatively, to 
require a current shareholder to be the highest bidder in order to continue grazing on 
4Though shareholders typically must file a derivative action in order to assert that 
an action was ultra vires, see Utah Code Annotated §16-6a-304 (2004), such an action is 
allowed in a non-derivative context if the action is brought by a corporate director. See 
id, at § 16-6a-304(2)(a)(i). When he filed the original complaint in 1999, Okelberry was 
actually serving as the president of the corporation, (see Attachment B, Findings at 19), 
and was therefore authorized to file that suit non-derivatively. 
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that land) was an ultra vires act in light of the accepted facts that (i) the purpose of the 
corporation was to provide grazing lands for its members, and (ii) that it was always 
anticipated that the shareholders would have the ability to put their livestock on that 
very land. 
In light of these facts, there are two clear reasons why this Court should affirm 
the conclusion that the decision to lease the land was in fact ultra vires. First, as a 
statement of general contractual language, the corporate charter simply does not 
authorize the leasing or selling of the land, whether to a member or non-member. 
Instead, the Articles only authorized West Daniels to perform three specific actions as 
part of its efforts to "obtain lands for grazing purposes to assist in helping its 
members/' Specifically, West Daniels was authorized (i) to "hold" grazing land; (ii) to 
"own" grazing land; and (iii) to "manage grazing land." Significantly, there was no 
mention there of any authority to either "lease" the grazing land or to "sell" grazing 
land. Given that the Articles were drafted by an attorney, this silence is striking and 
should be presumed as intentional. 
Second, the suggestion that West Daniels was authorized to lease its grazing land 
out to bidders is simply untenable with the stated purposes of the corporation. If it 
was in fact the corporate purpose to provide grazing land to the shareholders, then the 
leasing out of that very land would by definition be an act that deprived those 
shareholders of the central right to which they were specifically entitled. Further, 
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contrary to West Daniels' suggestion, the unlawfulness of this result is not changed if 
the high bidder was in fact a shareholder. Even if Okelberry himself had been the 
high bidder, for example, his status as the sole leaseholder would have necessarily 
prevented another shareholder from enjoying his or her own grazing rights. In this 
manner, the entire corporate purpose would have been stymied. 
The unauthorized nature of this act is made clear by taking West Daniels' 
argument to its logical conclusion. Suppose that instead of deciding to lease its land, 
the West Daniels board had instead decided to sell it outright. Under West Daniels' 
argument, this action would have been authorized under the general grant of powers 
given to nonprofit corporations under section 16-6a-302. At that point, however, 
West Daniels would have been manifestly unable to continue fulfilling its corporate 
purpose of "managing] grazing land" for its members. As is made clear by this 
example, West Daniels' specific corporate purpose required it to continue to own land 
and to continue making that land available for use by its shareholders; insofar as this 
specific purpose contradicts the general language of section 16-6a-302, it is clear that 16-
6a-302 is inapplicable.5 
5Given the absence of any discussion in the Articles regarding the eventual 
disgorgement of corporate-owned lands, the question naturally arises as to whether West 
Daniels would be required to hold those lands indefinitely. In interpreting articles of 
incorporation or bylaws, "the parties' intentions are controlling." Turner, 910 P.2d at 
1225. Here, the stated corporate purpose was to provide grazing land for the members 
of the corporation for a period of "ninety-nine years from the date of incorporation." 
(Attachment A). Presumably, West Daniels would be authorized to sell off its lands at 
the end of that ninety-nine year period as a means of winding down the corporate affairs. 
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Thus, though 16-6a-302(2)(d) does authorize leasing or selling land in ordinary 
situations, 16-6a-302(2)(d) simply should not be read to allow the leasing of corporate 
land (i) where there is no authority provided in the corporate documents, and (ii) 
where the leasing and selling of the land would in fact violate the stated corporate 
purposes of the corporation. At the time that this decision was made, Okelberry was a 
dues paying, assessment-compliant shareholder in good standing, and he was therefore 
entitled to use that land for grazing purposes without having to outbid other persons 
for that right. The decision to lease this land out was therefore an ultra vires act that is 
simply outside the scope of the business judgment rule. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT HAD AUTHORITY UNDER RULE 54(c) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE TO DETERMINE 
THAT THE WEST DANIELS LAND ASSOCIATION BREACHED 
ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES. 
Next, it is true that though Okelberry's pleadings did not specifically ask for 
relief based on West Daniels' breach of its fiduciary duties, the trial court ultimately 
based its award of relief on the finding that a breach of fiduciary duties had occurred. 
Contrary to West Daniels' assertions, however, the fact that Okelberry did not ask for 
such relief in his pleadings does not mean that the trial court's ultimate conclusion in 
error. 
Such an action would presumably be appropriate under those circumstances only because 
the corporate purpose of providing grazing land to its members for ninety-nine years 
would at that time have been fulfilled. Where the ninety-nine year corporate period has 
not yet expired, however, such an action should in fact be deemed inconsistent with the 
overarching corporate purpose. 
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Under rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "every final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if 
the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." In Richards v. Baum, 914 
P.2d 719 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court stated that rule 54(c)(1) "has been 
invoked by this Court on numerous occasions . . . so that substantive law, rather than 
a procedural technicality based on an insignificant lapse in the pleadings governs the 
outcome of a case." Id, at 723. Thus, "the policy of our rules of procedure is to decide 
cases on the merits rather than pleading technicalities." Guardian State Bank v. F.C. 
Stangl IIL 778 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah 1989). 
In analyzing the similar federal rule, Wright & Miller have thus noted that 
"[t]he question is not whether plaintiff has asked for the proper remedy but whether 
plaintiff is entitled to any remedy." Wright & Miller, 10 Federal Practice & Procedure 
3d § 2664 (2004).6 Wright & Miller then list multiple examples where rule 54(c) was 
properly invoked, including (i) a case where the court awarded attorney fees even 
though it was not demanded in the pleadings, (ii) a case where the complaint had asked 
for cancellation and rescission of a contract, and the court went on to instead order 
specific performance, and (iii) a case where the suit had asked for a declaration of rights 
under a contract, and where the judge had instead determined that the defendant 
6
 "It is well-established that decisions and treatises examining the federal rules of 
civil procedure can be considered as guidance in interpreting Utah's own rules of civil 
procedure." Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, 2004 UT App 44,137 n.7, 87 P.3d 734. 
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should be liable for conversion. See 10 Federal Practice & Procedure 3d at § 2664. As 
is clear from these and other examples, Rule 54(c) therefore allows the court to 
*award[] a different type of relief from that demanded in the complaint." Id. 
Under Utah jurisprudence, rule 54(c)(1) allows a court to rule on issues that 
were not specifically alleged in the pleadings if the relief is "supported by the evidence" 
and "a permissible form of relief for the claims litigated," and if there is no prejudice to 
the other party. Butler v. Wilkinson. 740 P.2d 1244, 1263 (Utah 1987); accord 
Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos. 310 P.2d 517, 519-20 (Utah 1957). In the present case, 
Okelberry sought relief based on his contention that West Daniels had conducted 
various unauthorized actions that had impaired his rights as both a shareholder and an 
individual. As discussed more fully above, Okelberry's complaint asked for relief 
under two separate theories: first, as a declaratory relief action, and second as a breach 
of contract action. (See Attachment D). Additionally, paragraph 33 of the Amended 
Complaint also alleged that Okelberry was entitled to an express judgment that 
Okelberry was in fact entitled to use of all corporate assets. 
At trial, the issue of whether Okelberry was deprived of his rights to the use of 
corporate assets by the decisions of the West Daniels board was a central part of the 
presentations. For example, after being called to the stand as part of the plaintiffs 
case-in-chief, Okelberry spent considerable time discussing the damages that he had 
personally incurred because of West Daniels' decision to lease the land to a non-
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shareholder. (See, e.g., R. 568 at pp. 72-79). Discussing the decision to lease the land 
to a non-shareholder, Okelberry opined that the directors "are entitled to do what 
they want with what they got, but to lease it out to a complete nonmember, and then 
I have to find other pasture, there's something wrong here." (R. 568 at p. 80). After 
Okelberry had finished testifying, his counsel then called an expert to the stand to 
testify regarding the economic damage (such as through unnecessary shrinkage of 
cattle) that Okelberry had suffered as a direct result of the corporation's decision to 
lease the land to a non-shareholder. (See R. 568 at pp. 100-121). 
After receiving this testimony, a colloquy occurred wherein the trial court 
expressly informed West Daniels' counsel that it regarded the decision to lease the land 
to a non-shareholder an unauthorized act. Specifically, after the court expressed its 
concern that West Daniels' actions had "totally den[ied]" Okelberry use of the 
property and that this action was "clearly a violation of the articles of incorporation," 
West Daniels' counsel responded by acknowledging that he was in fact "prepared to 
address" the issues regarding "misuse of corporate assets." (R. 568 at p. 126). As part 
of that effort, for example, West Daniels' counsel openly and actively participated in 
the questioning of various witnesses regarding the process by which West Daniels' land 
was submitted for public bidding. (See R. 569 at pp. 105-106). Finally, the issue of 
whether the corporation had a right to lease out the land was a central part of both 
parties' closing statements. Okelberry's counsel, for example, argued that "one thing 
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that we're asking this Court to rule upon [was] that he has a right to use that private 
property, not just on a restricted amount, but for the full use of the 401 head of cattle 
that he has," (R. 569 at 124-125), while West Daniels' counsel made contradictory 
representations in his own presentation. (See R. 569 at 128-129). 
In light of the fact-specific nature of fiduciary duty determinations, see C &Y 
Corp. v. General Biometrics. Inc.. 896 P.2d 47, 54 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding 
that "the law of breach of fiduciary duty by corporate directors is 'highly fact-
dependant'"), trial courts are given abroad" or "ample discretion" in adjudicating 
possible breaches of fiduciary duties. Id, at 54, 55. Here, the central contention that 
was pleaded and then litigated at trial was that the board of West Daniels did not have 
the authority to lease out corporate land to non-members, and that Okelberry was 
therefore personally entitled to damages stemming from that decision. After hearing 
the evidence, the trial court was thus well within its rule 54(c) authority when it 
determined that this evidence in fact supported an award based on a violation of 
fiduciary duties.7 
7
 On page 23 of its brief, West Daniels suggests that "the only logical reason" for 
the trial court's failure to rule on the contract claim was that "there simply was no 
contract between the Board and Okelberry." In ascribing negative connotations to the 
court's silence, West Daniels obviously overlooks the equally plausible positive 
interpretation-namely, that after determining that Okelberry was entitled to relief based 
on a fiduciary duty claim, the trial court could have then simply determined that a ruling 
on the contract claim was now unnecessary. Though arguments can be made for or 
against each of these interpretations, the simple fact remains that the trial court, for 
whatever reason, did not in fact issue a ruling on the contract claim itself. 
It is well accepted in Utah that the appellate courts should avoid issuing rulings on 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY REFUSING TO REQUIRE 
OKELBERRY TO COMPLY WITH THE DERIVATIVE SUIT 
REQUIREMENTS. 
West Daniels next argues that the trial court erred by failing to apply the Utah 
derivative lawsuit requirements to this case. As noted by West Daniels, Utah law does 
state that claims for corporate mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duties are 
corporate claims for which a plaintiff is ordinarily required to file a derivative action. 
See Warner v. DMG Color, Inc.. 2000 UT 102,112, 20 P.3d 868. Further, as was also 
noted by West Daniels, the Utah Nonprofit Act does ordinarily require a plaintiff to 
make a demand on a nonprofit corporation prior to filing a derivative action. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-612(3)(a)(i) through -612(3)(a)(ii). In spite of these 
unquestioned principles, there are two separate reasons why Okelberry's failure to 
comply with the derivative action requirements in this case do not constitute 
reversible error. 
First, though compliance with the derivative action requirements would have 
been necessary for Okelberry to have filed any fiduciary duty claims, the salient fact is 
that Okelberry did not actually file such claims as part of his original prayer for relief. 
issues that were not ruled on below. See Alta Health Strategies. Inc. v. CCI Mech. Serv., 
930 P.2d 280, 284 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (a[B]ecause the trial court did not rule on this 
issue, it is not properly before us and we decline to address it."); see also Lipscomb v. 
Chilton. 793 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1990) ("In view of the fact that the trial court did not 
reach this defense and did not rule on its merits, we do not reach this issue."). As such, 
should this Court now overturn the fiduciary duty ruling, Okelberry respectfully requests 
that this Court then remand this case to the trial court with instructions that the trial 
court enter a ruling on the contract claim. 
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Instead, Okelbeny chose to ask for declaratory relief and contractual relief. As 
discussed above, however, the trial court disregarded Okelberry's framing of the issues 
after it had heard the evidence, and instead determined that relief was instead justified 
due to West Daniels' breach of its fiduciary duties. 
Given this somewhat unique scenario, the question now before this Court is 
whether a trial court's authority to award relief under rule 54(c) is limited where the 
relief that is ultimately granted would have required specialized pleading if it had been 
included in the complaint itself. In essence, West Daniels' argument here is that 
although rule 54(c) expressly authorizes a judgment on grounds that were not actually 
pleaded, such a judgment is nevertheless impermissible when the plaintiff has failed to 
properly plead those claims. On its face, this argument simply makes no sense-either 
rule 54(c) allows relief in the absence of proper pleading, or it doesn't. There does not 
appear to be any authority, either in rule 54 itself or in the supporting cases, that 
would impose a proper-pleading requirement on a rule that expressly allows relief in 
the absence of any pleading at all. Taken to its logical conclusions, West Daniels' 
argument would effectively eviscerate rule 54(c). As such, this Court should hold that 
Okelberry's failure to satisfy the derivative action requirements is not fatal to the 
ultimate award of relief under fiduciary duty theories. 
The illogic of such a rule becomes further clear when applied to other claims for 
which special pleading rules are required. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff filed a 
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claim alleging breach of contract and that, after reviewing the evidence, the trial court 
determined that the plaintiff was instead entitled to damages under a fraud theory. It 
would be folly in that circumstance to suggest that the plaintiffs right to receive that 
compensation is limited due to a failure to plead fraud with particularity as is 
ordinarily required by rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Imposing such a 
requirement would defeat the very purpose of rule 54-which is to ensure that a litigant 
receives "the relief to which [he or she] is entitled," Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1), regardless 
of whether there has been a lapse in the pleadings. 
Second, as discussed by West Daniels in its opening brief, this Court has 
recognized that an exception to the derivative suit requirement exists in certain 
situations. Specifically, a shareholder is allowed to "bring an individual cause of action 
if the harm to the corporation also damaged the shareholder as an individual rather 
than as a shareholder." DLB Collection Trust v. Harris. 893 P.2d 593, 596 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (emphasis in original). In such situations, the plaintiff must be able to 
show that he or she has "suffered [an] injury that was direct to his [or her] own person, 
property, or personal legal status," and which would have been suffered "irrespective 
of his status as a shareholder." Bio-Thrust, Inc. v. Division of Corp., 2003 UT App 
360, % 12, 80 P.3d 164. Under this exception, an individual action may therefore be 
filed where "the wrong itself amounts to a breach of duty owed to the shareholder 
personally," id., or where the affected right is one that "belong[s] severally" to the 
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shareholder. Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp.. 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980); 
accord 19 Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 1940 (noting that the violated duty must have "its 
origin in circumstances independent of the plaintiffs status as a stockholder"). 
Admittedly, an application of the DLB exception to the present case would 
require a slight extension of the exception's scope. Such an extension is warranted, 
however, because the facts of this case present a unique comingling of corporate and 
private interests that has not similarly been involved in any of the prior cases. 
Specifically, there is no question that the damage that Okelberry suffered as a result of 
the improper corporate actions was to his own livestock and to his own livestock 
operation. Under this particular corporate scheme, Okelberry still personally owned 
his livestock, still personally ran his own livestock operation, and West Daniels did 
not in any way acquire any sort of ownership or pecuniary interest in either 
Okelberry's livestock or his livestock operation. As such, the trial court's 
unchallenged factual finding that Okelberry suffered $13,716 in damage, (Attachment 
B, Findings at f23), does in fact represent an "injury that was direct to his own person, 
property, [and] personal legal status," Bio-Thrust, Inc., 2003 UT App 360 at f 12, and 
was in fact a "harm specific to plaintiff, as opposed to [a] harm [that] affectfed] other 
shareholders or creditors of the corporation." Warner v. DMG Colon Inc., 2000 UT 
102, ^16, 20 P.3d 868. Further, there is no question that the affected livestock "belong 
severally" to Okelberry, Richardson, 614 P.2d at 639, and that any claim for damages 
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that would have served as the basis for his derivative action would in fact have been 
predicated on his own personal loss. 
The wrinkle here, however, lies in the admitted fact that Okelberry was only 
entitled to graze his livestock on the affected lands because of his membership in the 
corporation. Thus, where the DLB exception normally contemplates that the 
corporate violation will damage corporate-derived or corporate-provided assets (such 
as stock), the present case presents a somewhat different situation where the damage 
was done to Okelberry's personal assets, but where Okelberry was only in a position 
to be harmed because of his status as a shareholder. 
In essence, this situation is made possible only because of the somewhat unique 
nature of West Daniels' corporate scheme. As discussed above, the motivating thrust 
behind the formation of this corporation was the desire of certain independent 
livestock owners to collectively purchase and manage property, and to then allow each 
individual owner to run his or her own livestock operation, independent of the others, 
using the collectively purchased and managed land. Under this particular scheme, it 
can therefore be argued that the duties that were owed to each individual member 
were dualistic in nature, thereby concomitantly and contractually running to each 
individual member as both an individual business owner and as a shareholder. 
As such, this Court should extend the DLB exception so as to allow a 
shareholder whose membership in a corporation is expressly and directly intertwined 
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with his or her own independent business or property interests to have the 
opportunity to seek redress as an individual, rather than as a shareholder. Applied to 
the facts of this case, this extension of the rule would simply mean that, even if 
Okelberry had chosen to plead causes of action stemming from fiduciary duties and 
corporate mismanagement, his unique position as an affected individual entitled him to 
bring those actions directly. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING WEST DANIELS' 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Finally, West Daniels asks this Court to overturn the trial court's denial of its 
motion for a new trial. As indicated in its brief, the motion for a new trial was based 
on the trial court's rulings with respect to (i) the alleged application of the business 
judgment rule and (ii) the alleged application of Utah's derivative judgment 
requirements. For the reasons discussed above, this Court should now hold that 
neither ruling was erroneous, and that the failure to grant a new trial based on these 
arguments was therefore correct. 
III. JUDGE SCHOFIELD ERRED IN DISMISSING OKELBERRY'S 
CLAIMS RELATING TO THE PRECONDITIONS FOR OWNERSHIP 
OF WEST DANIELS STOCK. 
In addition to rejecting the arguments put forth by West Daniels, this Court 
should also determine that Judge Schofield erred in dismissing Okelberry's claims 
relating to the preconditions for ownership of West Daniels stock. 
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In the amended complaint, Okelberry asserted that various members of West 
Daniels had sold their rights to the Forest Service permits "without relinquishing their 
shares in the Association," (Attachment D at f 13), and that this was improper because 
the shares were "tied to the permits." (Attachment D at ^13). Okelberry further 
alleged that, insofar as "the right to run cattle is the express purpose of the non-profit 
corporation," (Attachment D at f24), "the right to run cattle is necessary to be a 
member of the Association." (Attachment D at t23). As such, Okelberry asked for an 
order transferring the shares of stock owned by non-permit owning members to 
members who still held valid Forest Service permits. (Attachment D at f28). 
Okelberry also asked for "judgment from the Court determining membership in the 
Association and the amount of shares held." (Attachment D at t31). 
In the May 21, 2001 ruling issued by Judge Schofield, the court dismissed 
Okelberry's declaratory judgment claim. (See Attachment E at pp. 4-5). Judge 
Schofield thereby ruled that "the articles of incorporation do not contain any 
preconditions to stock ownership, such as grazing permits or cattle," and that any 
argument to the contrary would necessarily be violative of the Articles and thus void. 
(Attachment E at p. 4). 
Contrary to Judge Schofield's ruling, however, the Articles do contain language 
that places limitations on the ownership of stock in West Daniels. Specifically, the 
Articles state that the "two shares shall be issued for each head of livestock," 
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(Attachment A), thus expressly tying the amount of stock that a shareholder could 
own to the number of cattle that the shareholder was grazing on corporation land. 
Rather than dismissing Okelberry's claim in the pre-trial stages, Judge Schofield 
therefore should have allowed Okelberry to proceed to trial for the purposes of 
introducing evidence regarding the numbers of shareholders in West Daniels who did 
or didn't currently graze livestock, and the court then should have issued a ruling that 
settled the question of whether those members who no longer grazed livestock on 
West Daniels land were still entitled to possess shares of stock in the corporation.8 
Judge Schofield's ruling that there is no precondition to ownership of stock also 
is incorrect because it allows a shareholder to possess stock in West Daniels even if that 
shareholder is literally incapable of participating in the specific, narrowly-defined 
corporate purposes for which West Daniels was created. As discussed above, the 
Articles expressly state that West Daniels' purpose was ato hold and own and manage 
grazing land for the purpose of grazing animals." (Attachment A). As such, Judge 
Schofield's ruling is incorrect because it would allow a person to hold stock in this 
nonprofit grazing corporation, even if the person did not still graze cattle on corporate 
lands. 
8Even if the court were to have determined that the "two shares shall be issued for 
each head of livestock" language was ambiguous, then it still should have allowed 
Okelberry to proceed to trial for the purposes of proving the intent of the parties with 
respect to that contractual language. See Turner, 910 P.2d at 1225 (holding that, in 
interpreting articles of incorporation or bylaws, "the parties' intentions are controlling"). 
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The corporate inequities produced by this ruling are clear. Whereas the Articles 
expressly condition ownership of stock on a two share/head basis, Judge SchofiekTs 
ruling now allows a shareholder to theoretically own stock on a 10 share/head ratio, a 
20 share/head ratio, or even beyond. Indeed, a member could theoretically have sold 
all of his or her cattle, and yet could still have retained ownership of his or her shares 
of West Daniels stock. As a result, these non-livestock owning members would then 
only have had an interest in the West Daniels land as a potentially profitable piece of 
property that was ripe for lease, sell, or development, rather than as a piece of land 
necessary for their individual grazing operations.9 It was this concern that was at the 
heart of Okelberry's declaratory judgment complaint, and Okelberry was therefore 
entitled to a trial on the issues of whether those members who no longer graze cattle 
should be allowed to retain their stock. 
Additionally, Judge Schofield's ruling was also incorrect insofar as it expressly 
allowed shareholders to maintain stock in the corporation even after selling their 
Forest Service permits. The error of this ruling can only be properly understood in 
context. Judge Eyre correctly noted in his post-trial findings of fact that the 5200 acre 
of land owned by West Daniels did not have enough forage to allow for year-round 
9As exemplified by the decision to lease out West Daniels grazing land to a non-
shareholder, such a shift in corporate purpose has in fact occurred, thus potentially 
changing this nonprofit grazing corporation into a speculative, land-leasing profitable 
enterprise. 
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grazing by the livestock that were owned by West Daniels members.10 For this reason, 
members of West Daniels only grazed their animals on the West Daniels lands "in the 
spring and the fall for a one-month to a six-week period of time." (Attachment B, 
Findings at 18). During the summer months, however, the livestock were moved onto 
the adjoining Forest Service lands and were grazed there for the entirety of the 
summer season. Given these grazing cycles, the West Daniels lands were thus only 
"used prior to going onto the Forest Service lands and then coming off the Forest 
Service lands." (Attachment B, Findings at 1[8).n 
Given this reality, a West Daniels member who did not maintain a valid Forest 
Service permit would not have had adjacent land on which to graze his or her livestock 
during the summer months, and therefore would not have been able to continue 
maintaining a livestock operation on West Daniels land at all. In this manner, 
ownership of Forest Service permits essentially became a de facto requirement for 
continued grazing of livestock and continued participation in the corporate scheme. 
10Specifically, there was testimony from West Daniels' own witness at trial that the 
West Daniels lands only had enough forage to be able to support 200 head of livestock in 
a given summer, far below the amount that would be needed to support the cattle that 
were owned by the collective members of the West Daniels. (See R. 569 at 44). 
uThis practice is entirely consonant with standard ranching procedures. As 
explained by the expert witness who was called to discuss the livestock issues in this case, 
"a good operating ranch has winter ranges that they put the cattle on in the winter and 
they go from the winter right to the spring range, and then the summer range back on the 
fall range. It's a natural circle, natural flow." (R. 568 at 104). When asked whether that 
"natural flow [would] be important for the operation of Mr. Okelberry's" ranch, that 
same expert stated that it would be. (See R. 568 at 104-05). 
PAGE 37 OF 40 
Thus, when members of West Daniels began selling off their Forest Service permits, it 
wasn't simply a function of them dividing their livestock operations. Rather, it was 
instead an indicator that they were in fact getting out of the livestock business 
altogether. Under these circumstances, it was thus improper to allow West Daniels 
members to sell their Forest Permits, stop running cattle on West Daniels land, and 
yet still retain stock and voting rights in a corporation whose stated purpose was to 
graze cattle.12 
12In spite of the fact that Judge Schofield's ruling prevented Okelberry from 
bringing forth evidence regarding the link between Forest Service permits and West 
Daniels stock at trial, some evidence regarding this link still emerged at trial. One of West 
Daniels5 own witnesses, for example, stated on the stand that he couldn't think of one 
instance prior to 1990 in which a person had bought stock in West Daniels without 
concomitantly obtaining the rights to the Forest Service Permits. (R.569 at p.32). There 
was also some testimony at trial that indicated in passing that the corporate framers of 
West Daniels in fact always intended stock in West Daniels to be linked to ownership of 
Forest Service permits. (See, e.g., R. 569 at 66). Finally, the Bylaws themselves expressly 
create such a link, therein providing that shareholders can only serve on the Board of 
Directors if they also own valid Forest Service permits. (See Attachment C at Article IV). 
The absence of further evidence in this regard, however, actually points to the 
fundamental problem with Judge Schofield's ruling. Okelberry expressly argued in his 
complaint that ownership of Forest Service permits was a requirement for continued 
ownership of stock in West Daniels under the terms and purposes of the corporate 
charter. Given that questions regarding the meaning of a corporation's articles of 
incorporation call for an analysis of the corporate framers' intent, Okelberry was at the 
very least entitled to a trial at which he could have presented his evidence regarding the 
longstanding and originally-intended link between the permits and the stock. Judge 
Schofield's ruling prevented him from having this trial, however, and thereby 
prematurely settled an issue that should only have been settled after the presentation of 
the evidence. 
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As such, this Court can and should hold that ownership of Forest Service 
permits was required in order to continue holding West Daniels stock. In the 
alternative, this Court should at the very least determine that Okelberry is entitled to 
a trial on the issue of whether a person can hold stock in West Daniels without 
concurrently owning valid Forest Service permits as well. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the decision of the trial 
court that the decision to lease West Daniels land to non-members was a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Further, this Court should overturn the decision below that prevented 
Okelberry from also trying the issues relating to the preconditions for ownership of 
stock in West Daniels. 
DATED this 2$_ day of November, 2004. 
D. 
DON R. PETERSEN-arid 
RYAN D. TENNEY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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holders present at a duly called neeting and a member mny be removed by a Tote 
of tuo-thirde of the members pi*esent at a duly called and con.ti tuted meeting. 
QkJ/?A~*uJL> 
Chairman of tne iaeeting. 
Subscribe'] -EM ^ o m to before r.e th i s **} 7 ' *- day of ^JL^^f f t l l 
A.D., 1052. 
rotary Public 
*'y C^vlrsior TV^ires: Heaidir- i ^ ^ r ^ ^ / ^ ^ . 
O A H 0 ? O P T I C S 
STATE CF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
/gr»^t<5 P.C>?/>*.r- the duly elected president of the VEST DA1ILEL3 
LA>T> ASSOCIATION; j P / / / ^/^^r^ t h Q ^ l ^ elected vice president of the Vest 
Daniels l^nd Association; ^///,%^ tf,C.o(^(c the duly elected secretary of 
the Vest Eaniols lend Association do each hereby seperately depose and affirm 
that : 
They v i l l discharge the duties of such office to the best of the i r 
judgement and that they v i l l not do nor consent to the doing of any matter 
or thing belating to the business of the corporation vi th intent to defraud 
any stockholder or creditor or the public. 
Xated this 2 1 A dgy of September A.D., 1952. 
Sobscri'bed sn& worn to before ice thlB 3 ")/< day of September, A.D., 
1952. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: 
, , Besidinc in P/-/T ?/=» 
CLERX'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SB. 
COUNTY OF WASATCH ) 
I, Wayne C. Whiting, County Clerk in and for Wasatch County, 
State of Utah, do certify and declare that the attached AFFIDAVIT and 
OATH OF OFFICE of the WEST DANIELS LAND ASSOCIATION, are full, true, 
and correct copies of the originals which were filed in my office the 
2nd day of October, A. D., 1952, and which are now on file and of 
record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal hereunto affixed at my 
office in Heber City, Utah, this 2nd day of October, A. D., 1952. 
Wayne C. Whiting, County Clerk 
(SEAL) Wasatch County 
By XhfivOM. b-Saurt &tA* Deputy 
AFFIDAVIT 
STATE CF XAH ) 
CCrjXTT OF WASATCH ) 
V/e, the undersigned officers of the V/est laniels Land Association 
IX) SOUMJLY S/SAR that the V/est laniels lend Association is a bona fide association, 
the object of which is not for pecuniary prof i t , tnat i t is organized with actual 
participating members; that i t will not be used for promoting gambling or any 
other viloation of lav; or ordinance. 
lt£<L~£s 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^  7 ^  day of 5^^-^r - » ! ^ 2 
Residing in 
My Comaission Zxpires: 
Exhibit B 
DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 30U North Street 
P O Box 1248 
Provo Ltah 84603 
Telephone (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile (801) 377-1991 
Oui File No 25,774 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAY OKELBERRY, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
WEST DANIELS LAND 
ASSOCIATION; DAN WRIGHT; 
STEVL BEfHERS, ELDON WRIGHT; 
JOHN BESSENDORFER; JAMES 
MORONI BESSENDORFER; BOB 
GAPPMAYER; and MRS. BONNER 
NELSON, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 9990500174 
Judge Donald J. Eyie 
This matter came on regularly for trial on July 22 and 23. 2002. The plaintiff appeared 
in person and was represented by his attorney, Don R. Petersen Officers of the defendant West 
Daniels Land Association appeared in person and were represented by their attorney, Joseph T. 
Dunbeck, Jr. The Court having previously ruled on certain issues, which rulings are dated 
January 5, 2000, and May 21, 2001, and now being fully advised in the premises, makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. West Daniels Land Association is a duly organized non-profit corporation under 
the laws of the State of Utah. 
2. The Affidavit of Incorporation presented as Exhibit 1 in this case shows that 
there are 1,390 outstanding shares of the corporation, and that the purpose of the corporation 
as set forth in the Affidavit is to obtain lands for grazing purposes to assist in helping its 
members. 
3. Shares of the organization were based upon two shares per one head oi 
livestock. It was anticipated that the shareholders would put their livestock on the land to be 
acquired by the Association. 
4. The Court finds that there was only one organization, although there have been 
two organizations named throughout (lie lawsuit, those being West Daniels Land Association and 
West Daniels Cattle Association. The Court finds these entities to be one and the same Up 
until recent times, individuals associated with those organizations were the same individuals, 
having the same common meetings to a large extent. The individuals who signed the Bylaws 
for the West Daniels Cattle Association initially were ail shareholders in the West Daniels Land 
Association. It was further represented in applications to the U.S. Forest Service that West 
Daniels Cattle Association was a duly organized corporation under the laws of the State of Utah. 
5. The Court finds that there was no evidence presented that there was ever such 
an entity known as West Daniels Cattle Association created under the laws of the State of Utah. 
Further, the Court finds that in making application to the U.S. Forest Service, West Daniels 
Cattle Association used the property that was the real property of the West Daniels Land 
Association to obtain the grazing permit. 
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6. The Court finds that the Bylaws for West Daniels Land Association, Exhibit 
2, have never been rescinded or amended, which is confirmed by the fact that in 1997, these 
Bylaws were submilted as part of the application to obtain the grazing agreement with the Forest 
Service. 
7. The Court finds that from i~s creation and acquisition, the private lands that 
have been testified to in court of apmoximately 5,200 acres are owned by the defendant West 
Daniels Land Association. Thrse lands were traditionally used in conjunction with the Forest 
Service lands and the Forest Service permits that were either owned outright by the shareholders 
of the corporation or were pooled as part of obtaining permits in the name of West Daniels 
Caltle Association with the Forest Service. 
8. The Court finds that Iraditionally the private lands were used in the spring and 
the fall for a one-month lo a six-week period of time. These lands were used prior to going onto 
the Forest Service lands and then coming off the Forest Service lands. The traditional use was 
changed pursuant to a letter received horn the Forest Service dated August 18, 1997, wherein 
the Forest Service cancelled the 160-head permit owned by the West Daniels Land Association. 
This is ieflected in Exhibit 17. The cancellation of the 160-head permit resulted in a decision 
made at the annual meeting of the defendant held February 27, 1998, wherein it was voted by 
the Association to create two herds, one herd to go onto the Forest Service land and one herd 
to remain on the private property. 
9. The Court finds that the plaintiff Ray Okelberry is a shareholder in the West 
Daniels Land Association and has served as an officer at various times, that he has owned stock 
in the borporation and was the President of said Association in 1998 and 1999. 
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10. The Court finds that the minutes of the February 27, 1998 annual meeting 
reflect the plaintiff voting against creation of the two herds and asked that they continue the 
operation as previously conducted. This motion was not seconded. The motion to create two 
herds passed by a majority7 of the shareholders voting at diat time. 
11. The vote of the February 27, 1998 meeting resulted eventually in the filing of 
the lawsuit now before the Court, which was filed in the year 2000, wherein the plaintiff asked 
for declaratory judgment with respect to certain interpretations of the Articles of Incorporation 
and the Bylaws of the corporation and asked for monetary damages resulting from the alleged 
breach of the obligations of the defendant corporation towards the plaintiff. 
12. The Court finds that the damages claimed by the plaintiff for 1998 will not be 
allowed. The Court finds that the plaintiff did have the use of the private lands of the defendant 
wherein he was permitted to have 60 head of cattle upon those private lands during the fall 
grazing period of 1998. 
13. The Court will disallow the plaintiffs claim for damages for 1999 in that the 
organization, by and through him as President, chose not to use their Forest Service permit in 
that year and that the plaintiff chose not to use the private lard himself because he did not have 
the use of the Forest Service permit property adjoined thereto. There was testimony to the effect 
that the plaintiff could have used it if he had desired. 
14. The Court finds that with respect to the grazing years 2000 and 2001, the Board 
of Directors of the corporation chose not to use the private land for grazing by anyone. The 
Court finds that they have the right to do so pursuant to their rights in the Bylaws of the 
corporation to manage those lands and, therefore, the Court will not award any damages for the 
years 2000 and 2001. 
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15. With respect to the year 2002, the Court finds that in reviewing the minutes of 
the annual meeting held this year on February 5, 2002, the defendant West Daniels Land 
Association decided to lease the 5,200 acres. It was set forth in that meeting that it was for the 
purpose of generating money to pay expenses. The Court finds that based upon the testimony 
of the plaintiff and a Mr. Gappmayer, that they advertised the property for lease in several 
periodicals, local periodicals, statewide periodicals and awarded the lease of the 5,200 acres to 
the highest bidder. The Court finds that there was testimony that if a shareholder desired to do 
so, they could have bid themselves. 
16. The Court finds that the solicitation to the general public prior to inquiring of 
shareholders theniselve:* is a breach by the defendant corporation's Board of Director's duty to 
look after the best interests of the shareholders. The Court finds that the Board of Directors of 
the defendant corporation has a fiduciary duty lo use that land in the best interests of the 
shareholders and to promote the puipose of the corporation, which the Court has previously 
ruled is to provide grazing lands for the livestock owned by the shareholders. , 
17. The defendant Association is similar to an irrigation company which owns water 
rights that it pools for the joint benefit of the shareholders. The solicitation of bids for the 
grazing rights on the private land appears to be similar to an irrigation company thinking that 
it can raise more money by advertising the bidding of water to the highest bidder than by 
permitting its shareholders, who have a right to use that water on their farms, to use it for their 
farming operations. 
18. The Court finds that there was a breach of the obligation of management which 
the defendant corporation had to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff is entitled to damages 
resulting from that breach. 
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19. In reviewing the claim of damages set forth by the plaintiff, the Court finds that 
his claim with respect to the need to purchase additional feed is an appropriate damage which 
resulted from the breach. The plaintiff calculated this amount based upon 401 head of cattle. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff is really only entitled to 341 head of cattle on the Forest 
Service permits, and that the Court has determined based upon the $15-per-month AUM that that 
amount comes to $10,230.00. 
20. The Court fmds that the plaintiffs request for transportation is too speculative 
for the Court to determine an appropriate amount. The Court finds that there will be no award 
for damages for transportation. 
21. The Court finds that the claim of the plaintiff for labor is too speculative and 
will make no award for labor. 
22. With respect to the claim of the plaintiff for shrinkage of his livestock, the 
Court finds that there was a loss of weight produced on calves that can be calculated, and the 
3% calculation used by the plaintiff and his expert witness, Mr. Boswell, is reasonable. Said 
calculation is not to be based upon 401 calves but on 341 calves. The Court finds that amount 
to be $3,486.00. 
23. The Court finds that the shrinkage of the cows and bulls is too speculative and 
not immediately determined because the cows and bulls are not sold at the end of the season as 
are the calves. 
24. The Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant 
in the amount of $13,716.00. 
25 The Court finds that Judge Anthony W. Schofield has previously ruled upon 
one issue, and that ruling is incorporated herein. 
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26. The Court finds that as previously indicated by the Bylaws, Exhibit 2, that these 
Bylaws are for the corporation and shall govern the corporation to the extent that they are not 
in conflict with the Affidavit of Incorporation as set forth by Judge Schofield in his rulings. 
27. The Court finds that any decision, as has been reflected in the minutes of the 
defendant, will require a two-thirds approval of the shareholders to sell the property. This shall 
govern the operation of the defendant corporation until and unless those Bylaws are amended. 
28. The Court finds that the lease entered into by the defendant corporation for 
2002 was improper, and that any such leases in the future would be improper. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court incorporates the rulings of Judge Anthony W. Schofield, which 
rulings are dated January 6, 2000 and May 21, 2001. 
2. The West Daniels Land Association is a duly organized non-profit corporation 
under the laws of the State of Utah. 
3. There are currently 1,390 shares of stock outstanding in the corporation. 
4. The purpose of the corporation is to obtain lands for grazing purposes to assist 
in helping its members. 
5. The shares in the corporation are based upon two shares per one head of 
livestock. It was anticipated that shareholders would use their livestock on the land that was to 
be acquired by the Association. 
6. The Court concludes that there is only one organization, even though two 
organizations have been named throughout the lawsuii, those being West Daniels Land 
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Association and West Daniels Cattle Association. The Court concludes that those entities are 
one in the same. 
7. The Bylaws of the defendant Association received as Exhibit 2 have never been 
rescinded or amended. 
8. The defendant corporation has acquired approximately 5,200 acres of real 
property. This private property was used in connection with Forest Service lands that adjoined 
the private property. The Forest Service permits were either owned outright by shareholders 
of the corporation or were pooled as part of obtaining permits in the name of West Daniels 
Cattle Association with the Forest Service. 
9. The private lands (5,200 acres) were used in the spring and the fall for a one-
month to a six-week period prior to going onto the Forest Service lands and then coming off the 
Forest Service lands. 
10. The traditional use of the private land was changed by a letter received from 
the Forest Service dated August 18, 1997, wherein it cancelled the 160-head permit owned by 
the West Daniels Cattle Association as set forth in Exhibit 17. That cancellation resulted in a 
decision made at the annual meeting of the defendant held February 27, 1998, wherein it was 
voted by the Association to create two herds, one herd to go onto the Forest Service pennit 
property and one herd to remain on the private property. 
11. The plaintiff Ray Okelberry is a shareholder in West Daniels Land Association 
and has served as an officer at various times. He owned stock in the defendant corporation and 
served as President of the Association in 1998 and 1999. 
12. The minutes of the February 27, 1998 meeting reflect that the plaintiff voted 
against creating two herds and asked that they continue the operation as previously conducted. 
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That was not seconded. The motion to create two herds passed by a majority of the 
shareholders. 
13. The claim of the plaintiff for damages for 1998 will not be allowed. 
14. The claim of the plaintiff for damages for 1999 will not be allowed. 
15. The claim of the plaintiff for damages for the years 2000 and 2001 will not be 
allowed. 
16. The solicitation for bids for the year 2002 by the Board of Directors of the 
defendant corporation was a breach of its fiduciary duty. The directors had a duty to look after 
the best interests of the shareholders of the corporal ion. The directors had a fiduciary duty to 
use the private property in the best interest of the shareholders and to promote the purpose of 
the coiporation which is to provide grazing lands for livestock owned by the shareholders. 
17. There was a breach of the obligation of the management of the defendant 
corporation with respect to Mr. Okelberry. The Court concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to 
damages resulting from the breach of the duty owed to him. 
18. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in the amount of 
$10,230.00, which represents 341 head of cattle at the rate of $15.00 per month AUM. 
19. The request for transportation claimed by the plaintiff is too speculative. 
20. The Court concludes that the claim for labor made by plaintiff is too 
speculative. 
21. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in the amount of 
$3,486.00 for shrinkage based on a calculation of 341 calves. 
22. The plaintiffs claim for shrinkage of cows and bulls is too speculative. 
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23. The plaintiff is entitled to a total judgment against the defendant in the amount 
of $13,716.00. 
24. Any decision by the Board of Directors to sell the private property will require 
a two-thirds approval of the shareholders until and unless the bylaws of the corporation are 
amended. 
25. The Board of Directors of the defendant corporation is hereby prohibited from 
making any leases concerning the private property for grazing purposes. 
DATED this QJ day of November, 2002. 
COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JOSEPH T. DUNBECK, JR., ESQ. 
Attorney for Defendants 
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NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS' ATTORNEY 
TO: JOSEPH T. DUNBECK, JR. 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for plaintiff, will submit the 
above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Honorable Donald J. Eyre 
for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) 
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of 
the Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah. 
DATED this 3 3 day of August, 2002. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of August, 2002. 
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr., Esq. 
123 South Main Street, #1 
Heber City, UT 84032 
SECRETARY 
G \DRP\OKELBERR FOF 
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Exhibit C 
/ "&S L«JU£> 
VSST lASEILS CATTLE 
C 37-LAVL 
AF.TICLI I 
Sec t ion 1.« The n i^r.p cf t) i s U3reci~t ion «3h~ll ::e Vect Smie l s^Cabt lb 
AP&ocidticn. 
ARTICLE II 
Sec t ion 1 . . Tr.is ^b-scciat ion v i l i pru^ te .r,d r i t e c t ";^° business of 
r a i s i n g c a t t l e , work in coopera t ion with the Fores t Service in the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and use of the Fores t Service adminis te red grazing lands 
fo r vh ich t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n v i l l be r e c r g m - e d ; do nny and t i l things 
l a v f u l , j u s t , and necessa ry to "fur ther the inter* s t s cf t h i s a s soc ia t ion 
in graz ing and r e l a t e d m a t t e r s and c the rv iae in connect ion with the 
l i v e s t o c k i n d u s t r y . 
c a t t l e or the W a t D a n i e l / c - t t l e jUaoc i ° t ion r-s-,z* m*'r \»e i^rc- " 
DtJ rim 11e e mr nibs ^  V^_? as3cci-" : i r n cy o:; i .U' t 
sue Lr.itia ci^n fee -.s may be r e q u i r e d . 
S e c t i o n 1 . # The o f f i c e r s of the • sj^ci-fci-r1 , ** -~ t r o mcr'-nro of the 
board of d i r e c t o r s s h a l l be electr .c irwC IIZMTL-TJ a: t ^ -TL c -a t i^n 
tiold>ferriitr._fco\,^r3ze on Pores t Service a d j u n i r t e r e d innd tho kind vr.c Jiolq 
l i v e s t o c k fc r vhich t n i s a s s o c i a t i o n i s recognized by the Forest 
S e r v i c e , Tfro o f f i c e r s of saiJ. a s s o c i a t i o n sr i l l c o n s i s t of a p res iden t , 
v i c e - p r e s i d e n t , s e c r e t a r y - t r e a s u r e r . There s h s l l a l s r be two (2) 
a d d i t i o n a l members- The p r e s i d e n t , v i c 2 - p r e 3 i d s n t , s e c r e t a r y - t r e a s u r e r , 
end the w o a d d i t i o n a l members s h a l l c o r s t i t u t e t:x bc i rd cf d i r e c t o r s . 
S e c t i o n 2 . . Off icers of the a s s o c i a t i o n end members z'l the br^rd of* 
d i r e c t o r s , s h a l l be e l e c t e d fron members vno hole ^ r a - i r g permitg+jgn^ 
the a r ea representj^j3x.JLho^2aoci^Li^Ln.^. The • " f i c e ^ s cf the a s soc i a t i on 
and board members s h a l l be e l ec t ed by b a l l o t by pe rmi t t ee members and 
i n s t a l l e d a t the annual meeting or a t a s p e c i a l mtetir*^ and s.i^ll hold 
o f f i c e u n t i l the next annua l meet in* a f t e r t b e i r e l e c t i o n c r the rea f t e r 
u n t i l t n e i r successors have been e lec ted anu i n s t i l l e d , 
ARTICLE V 
Section 1.. It shall be the duty cf the President to preside at all 
meetings of the association and bcrrd cf directors, tc supervise the 
vork of the association, and direct the vcrk of its officers. Ee 
shall approve and countersign all checks for the expenditure of money 
for the association and shall perform all the dutiojj that devolve 
upon such office* 
ARTICLE VI 
Section 1 . . The Vice-President shal l perform o i l dut ies cf the president 
in the absence of the president-or in the event of h is i nab i l i t y tc ac t . 
ARTICLE VII 
Section 1 . . I t sha l l be the duty of the secret? ry-traasurr-r to conduct 
the correspondence cf the as^ociatirn; to teep "I I re orr is and accounts; 
tc make out and turn over tc the association a l i s t of a i l as3^3dii3n":E 
ordered by the associa t ion or the board of d i r e c t o r s , shcvirv; ~ach 
member's por t ion; to co l l ec t f~oc the nenlers c~ t> c associat ion the 
assessments made bj- i t or by tro board r.rw tc iaeue receipts tr.ts^efor; 
to keep in a book for th^t purpose an accurate - c c u n : c" the s^me; and 
to co a l l things necessary in the conduct r* t i e business of the 
associa t ion which may be assigned to hi^ bv t.,e assoc in t i rn c~ the hcc-rd. 
He sha l l sign a l l checks and vruchers ror dishu~sir.~ the fund:, of the 
- s s c c i a t i o - or fu r ; s receive*! b; h i s by r3 O~T f ' i s -fTi*:' \z S3c.:r:-ry-
t reasure r of tee associaxi;n ;" a~.d the YCUC" ore sh-11 sl'cv f^ - vh°t purpose 
such moneys are paid- He shall submit -i v r i t t ° r . report to the asscci-t icn 
a t i t s annual meeting, giving account of t1 e business t rcnsuct i rns of 
the associa t ion for the year just closed, Mro JT t r received >i:d disbursed, 
from vhep and on whe i account i\.c«ived, ^nd for vho.t purpose p^id ^at^ 
The books of the ^ ere tu^y- treasurer gl i l l oc «. udit»ad rj l eas t yearly 
by sucn persona c»s the association cay desiLnate -nd c re]_o~t of tht; 
audit sha l l be submitted to the association i t e rc v ^rir^^ljse^ting. 
The books of the secretary-tre-.surer shall bn open for inspection by 
any member of the associa t ien and the forest supervisor a t any and a l l 
t imes. He sha l l report promptly to the said forest supervisor for 
r ece ip t s cf a l l noneys from assessments, a l l changes in the personnel 
of the of f icers , bcerd cf directors , and members cf the associat ion, 
and a l l changes in the by-lavs. He shall a l so submit tc the said 
fo res t supervisor , vhen requested, an annual statement not l a t e r th?n 
January 15 of each year, covering a l l moneys received during the 
preceding calendar year under assessments levied, and indicating therein, 
m d e t a i l , the purpose for which such moneys were expended. 
Section 2 . . The secre ta ry- t reasurer of the associat ion shal l be the 
secre tary of the board of Directors . 
ARTICLE VIII 
Section 1 . . The board of d i rec tors may on behalf of t i 
en te r in to agreements, borrow money, assume obligations^ 
assessments, prescribe requirements pertaining to the use and occupancy 
of &he range for which t h i s association i s recognized. I t shal l 
^ t ransac t the general business of. the associat ion, and each and every 
act of the board in such matters shell be binding upon the association: 
Provided, That before the board may act in any matter which may require 
a payment by any member of a sum in excess of S IQ .OO^thg r i t y for 
such action must be given by a 2/3 majority of the/permittee \ismber3bip 
a t the annual or a t a spec ia l meeting. 
AHTICLE IX 
Section 1 . . Per the purpose of providing expenses, a l l members of the 
assoc ia t ion sha l l be assessed upon the to t a l number of livestock under 
permit and which are affected b-y the assessments, and the beard of 
d i r e c t o r s shall determine the number cf l ives tock of each member to be 
affected by the assessment: ^p/HHp^
 f That when an assessment is 
ilevied in connection with the handling of l ives tock on the range for 
which t h i s associat ion i s recognized, or any subdivision thereof, i t 
w i l l be based upon the number of livestock grazed thereon by each 
member under permit during the grazing season in which the assessment 
i s to be enforced. 
L. . 
ARTICLE X 
Section 1 . . The annual meeting of this associat ion shal l be held at 
. on . • . of each year. 
Section 2 . . Special meetings shal l be held at such times and places 
a3 may be designated by the president or a majority cf the board. 
V r i t t e n notice of a l l meetings of the associat ion sha l l be sent to 
the last-known address of e -^ch member by the secre tary- t reasurer at 
l e a s t 7 days before the date of such meeting. Notices covering 
spec i a l meetings sha l l s t a t e the purpose for which ca l led . No 
business shal l be t ransacted a t a special meeting except as stated 
in the notice unless the members in good standing present at the 
meeting give their unanimous consent thereto. 
Section 3«- Meetings of the board of directors shall be called by the 
secretary-treasurer upon request from the president, by a majority of 
the beard, or by the forest supervisor. 
ARTICLE XI 
Section 1*. Any officer of the association authorized to receive or 
disburse money for or on behalf of the association may be required to 
give the associat ion such bond for the proper discharge of h i s duty as 
the association may d i r e c t : Provided, That a jo in t bond may be given 
vhere more than one off icer ie designated to hnndle the funds. 
Section 2«, All disbursements of the funds of the associa t ion shall be 
made by check. 
ARTICLE XII 
Section 1 . . Amendments to the bylaws msv be mn-ie only a t th<? annual 
meeting by a 2/3 majority vote of the permittee members in good standing. 
Voting by proxy a t the e lec t ion of officers or board members, or on 
amendments to the bylaws sha l l only be empowered by the secretary cf 
said associat ion a f t e r having procured on an associat ion proxy form 
containing signature and au thor i ty to act for said permittee • 
ARTICLE XIII 
Section 1 # . Jlo business of the association 3hall be t ransacted a t any 
meeting unless a quorum i s prezent . A quorum for assoc ia t ion meetings 
s h a l l consist cf a majority of the permittee members of the association 
vho are present and in good standing at the time of the meeting. Except 
upon amendments to the bylaws a 2/3 majority vote vhen a quorum is present 
s n a i l carry. Unless a permittee member" is in good'Ttnnding he shall not 
be en t i t l ed to vote or to be elected to off ice. A permittee member shall 
not be in ^ood standing unless he shall have sifined^.nd_cjpmplied_j!rijih,all-. 
of the_requirements adopted by or on behalf of tne associa t ion under the 
bylaws... A quorum for~board of directors meetings s h a l l consis t of a 
majority of the board. 
Section 2«. Each permittee member in good standing shall be entitled to 
one vote for each grazing head. Except vhere otherwise provided, voting 
by proxy may be permitted in connection vith any business of the 
association afjjer having complied vith Section 1, Article XII* 
ARTICLE XIV 
Section 1*, The president, vice-president, and members of the board of 
directors shall receive a salary for services rendered in their 
respective positions, but the secretary-treasurer shall be allowed for 
his services vhatever compensation the association may authorize. 
ARTICLE X7 
Section 1.. Meetings of the association shall be conducted informally, 
but at the discretion of the presiding officer, Roberts1 Rules of 
Order may be invoked to conduct all forms and ^ .rder of business. 
Section 2., The order of business of any mee-cir.- of Vn3 jsccciation 
shall be as follows: 
1. Call to order 
2. Roll call and check standing of members 
3. Check for quorum 
4. Reading of minutes of last meeting 
5* Unfinished business 
6. Reports of secretary-treasurer and auditing committees 
7. Reading of communications 
8. Report of the beard of directors 
9. Reports of committees 
10* New business 
11. Election and installation of officers 
12. Admission of nev members 
13* Appointment of committees 
14. Adjournment 
ARTICLE XVI 
Section 1«. I t sha l l be the responsibi l i ty of said associat ion members 
to comply v i t h the "Utah State Livestock Lavs", as stated herein. 
The Utah code, Section 4-12-17 s ta tes : " I t shal l be unlawful to turn 
loose or range any c a t t l e upon the federal range cr forest reserves 
of th i s State without keepin therewith during the breeding season of 
each year one bu l l for every th i r t y h ^ d or f r cticr/ thereof of female 
breeding c a t t l e so ranged; provided that nr" perse;, so r*±risinr any 
port ion of t h i r t y head of female breeding ca t t l e m=.y provide and 
arrange for an in t e res t in e bul l running at large cr. the federal range 
of forest reserves vhere such c a t t l e are ringed." 
Section 4-12-23 of *che Utah Code s t a t e s : "I t sha l l b^ unlawful to ovn 
and turn loose or allow to run a t large upon the federal ranee or 
fores t reserves of t h i s s ta te any ether than a purebred graded bull of 
some recognized beef freed. The p-ir t icul ir breed md grade of sruch 
bu l l i s to be determined by the majority of the uiers on i>ny ^iven range 
c r grazing d i s t r i c t . A purebred bull a6 contemplated by this section 
must be a bu l l having a r eg i s t r a t ion car t i f i ca te fr:>m the breeding-
associat ion of i t s par t icu la r breed. 
Section 2.* I t sha l l be the duty of the association members to decide 
by a 2/3 majority vote at the annual meeting, the b~t?ed and gr-~de of the 
bul ls to be run en tha^llotment. 
Section 3*- I t sha l l be th* duty rf P-C*« re-*>?.? ~ r a:.in ?ns^cir.ticn ic 
furnish to the secre tary , a copy cf the r -g i ' - t ^ t io r . certificate- cf 
the bul l which sha l l be used for bree^i^g purpose.- on trie allotment 
and the number of years for which Laid bull wi l l b? permitted .3 a 
recognized breeding bu l l . 
Section 4». I t sha l l be the cuxy cf th~ bc^rd cf r . i /ect^rs to dntermiiv" 
the number cf years for which bulls wi l l be recognized as breeding 
bul l s upon said r«inge. 
Section 5** I t sha l l further be the dut\ cf each member tc notify in 
wr i t ing , the secre ta ry of sj.id associat ion, thr numbc-r oH fem-le 
breeding animals to be ranged during the breeding 3oascn ?rd further 
sc s t a te the bu l l fcr which breeding services h~*s bnen acquired, and 
further show rece ip t for having paid the breeding fees to the recognized 
owner of the bul l running a t larg^ on th° c^ittl? allotment. 
ARTICLE X7II 
I t sha l l be the duty of the President c.T s'»ic' associ ' . t ion, to 
appoint suoh board member and/o~ association members as may be necessary 
to t ransac t a l l business, l^bcr, r c l i t ec Fritters*, -vnd otherwise in 
connection with the following committees: 
1* Herding ar.ci movement of Cct t lc . 
2. Fencing ard dtabliz^.tion of c a t t l e , 
5. Water shed, w^ter s torage, nnc5 ponds. 
ART!ICI£ XVIII 
Section 1#. The Boarl of Directors at their annual meeting, shall 
establish an equitable and fair wage or salary as may be required for all 
vork completed, or to be completed by association members, persons for 
hire, machinery, and equipment for the maintenance, preservation, 
improvement, and continuation of the grazing allotment. Only partial 
remuneration vill be paid to minors for labor completed, provided they 
are not immediately supervised by a permit holder. 
ARTICLE XIX 
Section 1.. Ho permit holder of-said association shall transfer, sell, 
or put for sale all or any fraction thereof of a grazing permit to 
persons, firms, corporations, etc., without notification in writing 
with signature attached thereto, to both the president and secretary 
of said association. 
Section 2,. No permit holder of said association shall sell or put 
for 3ale all cr any fraction thereof of a grazing permit to pf;r.;;/-ns, 
firms, corporations, etc., other than the immediate members of the 
family, namely: father, mother, son, daughter, brother cr sister, 
without first providing an opportunity for permit holders in good 
standing to purchase at a fair and current price as agreed upon by 
seller and buyer or buyers, for such permit or fraction thereof. 
ARTICLE XX 
Sec t ion 1«* Ve the unders igned , members of the West Danielg'Vi5s lpriation. 
have r e a d , understood, and agree to"suppor t the b y - l a v s . 
:; }ANIELS CATTLE ASSOCIATION L 
ARTICLE I 
Section L.The name of this association shall be West Daniels Cattle 
Association 
ARTICLE II 
Section 1..This Association will promote and protect the business of raising 
cattle, work in cooperation with the Forest Service in the administration and 
use of the Forest Service administered grazing lands for which this Association 
will be recognized; do any and all things lawful, just, and necessary to 
further the interests of this Association in grazing and related matters and 
otherwise in connection with the livestock industry. 
ARTICLE III 
Section l..Any person, firm, or corporation holding a permit to graze cattle on 
the West Daniels Cattle Association Range may become a permittee member of the 
Association by signing the by-laws and paying such initiation fee as may be 
required. 
ARTICLE IV 
Section L.The officers of the Association, and the members of the board of 
directors shall be elected from members of the Association who hold permits to. 
graze on Forest Service administered land the kind of livestock for which this 
Association is recognized by the Forest Service. The officers of said 
Association shall consist of a president, vice-president, secretary-treasurer. 
There shall also be two (2) additional members. The president, vice-president, 
secretary-treasurer, and the two additional members shall constitute the board 
of directors. 
Section 2..Officers of the Association and members of the board of directors 
shall be elected from members who hold grazing permits on the area represented 
by the Association. The officers and board members of the Association shall be 
elected by ballot by permittee members and installed at the annual meeting or 
at a special meeting and shall-hold office until the next annual meeting after 
their election or, thereafter, until their successors have been elected and 
installed. 
ARTICLE V 
Section l..It shall be the duty of the president to preside at all meetings of 
the Association and board of directors, to supervise the work of the 
Assocation, and direct the work of its officers. He shall approve and 
countersign all checks for the expenditure of money for the Association and 
shall perform all the duties that devolve upon such office. 
ARTICLE VI 
Section L.The vice-^ti „
 yent shall perform all dutie^/^he president in the 
absence of the presiu^nt or in the event of his inabi^ _ty--TO act. 
ARTICLE VII 
Section l..It shall be the duty of the secretary-treasurer to conduct the 
correspondence of the Association; to keep all records and accounts; to make 
out and turn over to the Association a list of all assessments ordered by the 
Association or the borad of directors, showing each member's portion; to 
collect from the.members of the Association the assessments made by it or by 
the board and to issue receipts therefore; to keep in a book for that purpose 
and accurate account of the same; and to do all things necessary in the conduct 
of the business of the Association which may be assigned to him by the 
Association or the board. He shall sign all checks and vouchers for disbursing 
the funds of the Assocation or funds received by him by reason of his office as 
secretary-treasurer of the Association, and the vouchers shall show for what 
purpose such moneys are paid. He shall submit a written report to the 
Association at its annual meeting, giving account of the business transactions 
of the Association for the year just closed, amounts received and disbursed, 
from whom and on what account received, and for what purpose paid out. The 
books of the secretary-treasurer shall be audited at least yearly by such 
persons as the Association may designate and a report of the audit shall be 
submitted to the Association at each annual meeting. The books of the 
secretary-treasurer shall be open for inspection by any member of the 
Association and the Forest Supervisor at any and all times. He shall report 
promptly to the said Forest Supervisor for receipts of all money from 
assessments, all changes in the personnel of the officers, board of directors, 
and members of the Association, and all changes in the by-laws. He shall also 
submit to the said Forest Supervisor, when requested, an annual statement not 
later than January 15 of each year, covering all moneys received during the 
preceding calendar year under assessments levied, and indicating therein, in 
detail, the purpose for which such moneys were expended. 
Section 2..The secretary-treasurer of the Association shall be the secretary of 
the board of directors. 
ARTICLE VIII 
Section L.The board of drectors may, on behalf of the Association, enter into 
agreements, borrow money, assume obligations, levy assessments, prescribe 
requirements pertaining to the use and occupancy of the range for which this 
Association is recognized. It shall transact the general business of the 
Association, and each and every act of the board in such matters shall be 
binding upon the Association: Provided, that before the board may act in an^ 
matter which may require a payment by any member of a sum in excess of S f Q. 
authority for such action must be given by a 2/3 majority of the permittee 
membership at the annual or at a special meeting. 
ARTICLE IX 
Section l..For the purpose of providing expenses, all members of the 
association shall be assessed upon the total number of livestock under the 
permit and which are affected by the assessments, and the board of directors 
shall determine the number of livestock of each member to be affected by the 
assessment: Provide! \ Jt when an assessment is let ( * connection with the 
handling of livestock on the range for which this association is recognized, or 
'any subdivision thereof, it will be based upon the number of livestock grazed 
thereon by each member under the permit during the grazing season in which the 
assessment is to be enforced. 
ARTICLE X 
Section l..The annual meeting of this association shall be held at AfeGKiA&L£ 
on {J*f&fiABL€' of each year. 
Section 2.. Special meetings shall be held at such times and places as may be 
designated by the president or a majority of the board. Written notice of all 
meetings of the association shall be sent to the last-known address of each 
member by the secretary-treasurer at least seven days before the date of such 
meeting. Notices covering special meetings shall state the purpose for which 
called. No business shall be transacted at a special meeting except as stated 
in the notice unless the members in good standing present at the meeting give 
their unanimous consent thereto. 
Section 3-.Meetings of the board of directors shall be called by the 
secretary-treasurer upon request from the president, by a majority of the 
board, or by the Forest Supervisor. 
ARTICLE XI 
Section l..Any officer of the Association authorized to receive or disburse 
money for or on behalf of the Association may be required to give the 
Association such bond for the proper discharge of his duty as the Association 
may direct: Provided, that a joint bond may be given where more than one 
officer is designated to handle the funds. 
Section 2..All disbursements of the funds of the Association shall be made by 
check. 
ARTICLE XII 
Section 1..Amendments to the by-laws may be made only at the annual meeting by 
a 2/3 majority vote of the permittee members in good standing. Voting by proxy 
at the election of officers or board members, or on amendments to the by-laws 
shall only be empowered by the secretary of said Association after having 
procured on an Association Proxy Form contaiining signature and authority to act 
for said permittee-
ARTICLE XIII 
Section l..No business of the Association shall be transacted at any meeting 
unless a quorum is present. A quorum for Association meetings shall consist of 
a majority of the permittee members of the Association who are present and in 
good standing at the time of the meeting. Except upon amendments to the by-laws 
a 2/3 majority vote when a quorum is present shall carry. Unless a permittee 
member is in good standing he shall not be entitled to vote or to be elected to 
office. A permittee member shall not be in good standing unless he shall have 
signed and complied with all of the requirements adopted by or on behalf of the 
Association under tl ( f^laws. A quorum for board o./^^T ctors meetings shall 
consist of a majority 01 'the board. •- ^ -^ 
Section 2..Each permittee member in good standing shall be entitled to one vote 
for each grazing head. Except where otherwise provided, voting by proxy may be 
permitted in connection with any business of the association after having 
compiled with Section 1, Article XII. 
ARTICLE XIV 
Sec t ion L . T h e p r e s i d e n t , v i c e p r e s i d e n t , and members of the board of d i r ec to r s 
s h a l l r e c e i v e a s a l a r y for s e r v i c e s rendered i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s , but 
the s e c r e t a r y - t r e a s u r e r s h a l l be allowed fo r h i s s e r v i c e s whatever compensation 
the A s s o c i a t i o n may a u t h o r i z e . 
ARTICLE XV 
Section 1..Meetings of the Association shall be conducted informally, but at 
the discretion of the presiding officer, Roberts' Rules of Order may be invoked 
to conduct all forms and order of -^ business. 
Section 2..The order of business of any meeting of the Association shall be as 
follows: 
1. Call to order 
2. Roll call and check standing of members 
3- Check for quorum 
4. Reading of minutes of last meeting 
5- Unfinished business 
6. Reports of secretary-treasurer and auditing committees 
7- Reading of communications 
8. Report of the board of directors 
9- Reports of committees 
10. New business 
11. Election and installation of officers 
12. Admission of new members 
13. Appointment of committees 
14. Adjournment 
ARTICLE XVI 
Section l..It shall be the responsibility of said Association members to comply 
with the "Utah State Livestock Laws", as stated herein. The Utah code, Section 
4-12-17 states: "it shall be unlawful to turn loose or range any cattle upon 
the Federal range or Forest reserves of this state without keeping therewith 
during the breeding season of each year on bull for every thirty head or 
fraction thereof of female breeding cattle 50 ranged; provided that any person 
so ranging any portion of 30 head of female breeding cattle may provide and 
arrange for an interest in a bull running at: large on the Federal range of 
Forest reserves where such cattle are rangecl." 
Section 4-12-28 of the Utah Code states: "It shall be unlawful to own and turn 
loose or allow to run at large upon the Federal range or Forest reserves of 
this state any other than a purebred graded bull of some recognized beef 
Sect ion 2. .No permit^ V~aer of s a i d Assoc i a t i on sha l l l x— l or put for s a l e a l l 
or any f r a c t i o n tne reof of a g r az ing permit t o p e r s o n s , f i rms , co rpora t ions , 
e t c , o t h e r than t h e immediate members of t h e fami ly , namely: f a the r , mother, 
son, daugh te r , b r o t h e r or s i s t e r , without f i r s t p r o v i d i n g an oppor tuni ty for 
permit h o l d e r s i n good s t a n d i n g t o purchase a t a f a i r and c u r r e n t p r i c e as 
agreed upon by s e l l e r and buyer o r buyers , f o r such pe rmi t or f r a c t i o n thereof . 
ARTICLE XX 
Sec t ion l . .We t h e unders igned, members of t h e West Dan ie l s Assoc ia t ion , have 
r ead , unde r s tood , and agree t o suppor t the b y - l a w s . 
Date: s/ffa*7 
Signatures 
Exhibit D 
DON R. PETERSEN (2576), and 
SEAN M PETERSEN (8656), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 Our File No. 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAY OKELBERRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WEST DANIELS LAND 
ASSOCIATION; DAN WRIGHT; 
STEVE BETHERS; ELDON WRIGHT; 
JOHN BESSENDORFER; JAMES 
MORONI BESSENDORFER; BOB 
GAPPMAYER; and MRS. BONNER 
NELSON, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 9990500174 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
Division #8 
COMES NOW the plaintiff Ray Okelberry and hereby complains of the defendants as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a member and shareholder of the defendant corporation West Daniels 
Land Association. 
* / * 
/}• 
' I ' 
2. Defendant West Daniels Land Association is a Utah non-profit corporation 
under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of business in Charleston, Wasatch 
County, Utah. The corporation is in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
3. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations of this complaint. 
4. On October 6, 1952, the non-profit corporation entitled West Daniels Land 
Association was formed by filing an Affidavit with the Secretary of State. (Affidavit attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A.") 
5. The Affidavit indicates that weach share may cast one vote and that five 
members will be elected directors." (Exhibit "A," p. 1.) 
6. The Affidavit further indicates that Mtwo shares will be issued for each head of 
livestock." (Exhibit "A," p. 1.) 
7. The Affidavit states that "new members shall be received by a majority vote 
of the stockholders present at a duly called meeting." (Exhibit "A," p. 2.) 
8. At least twenty years ago, the Association adopted and signed bylaws for the 
corporation. (Bylaws attached hereto as Exhibit "B.") 
9. The bylaws carry the name West Daniels Cattle Association. 
10. The Association has used these bylaws in order to operate various aspects of 
the company. 
2 
11. Historically, the Association ran 695 head of cattle over private land owned by 
the Association and on U.S. Forest Service ground by way of waiver and permit. 
12. Recently, several changes have caused problems to arise among the members 
of the Association. 
13. The individuals listed herein as defendants are members of the Association and 
have sold their rights in the West Daniels Cattle Association U.S. Forest Service permit without 
relinquishing their shares in the Association, which were tied to the permits. 
14. These individual members do not run cattle equal to half of their current 
claimed ownership in the Association. Specifically, these members claim the right to own shares 
for 180 cattle, but only have the right to run 52 head of cattle. 
15. The U.S. Forest Service will also no longer manage the private ground owned 
by the Association. 
16. As a result, there is confusion concerning actual membership in the Association 
and as to the amount of ownership. 
17. The Association has held a disputed vote which has caused a hardship to various 
members of the Association, including the plaintiff. 
18. For the first time in the history of the Association, the vote was held by shares 
instead of "per-head" of cattle as required by the Articles of Incorporation. 
19. The vote was complicated by the confusion over ownership and voting rights. 
COUNT I 
3 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
20. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations of this complaint. 
21. Pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78 of the Utah Code Annotated, plaintiff seeks 
a declaratory judgment from the Court interpreting the Affidavit and the Bylaws of the 
Association in accordance with Utah law. 
22. As the Association is a non-profit corporation, ownership and voting rights may 
be enlarged, limited or denied based upon the Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws, so long 
as the Bylaws are not in conflict with the Articles. 
23. Plaintiff asserts that the right to run cattle is necessary to be a member of the 
Association. 
24. The right to run cattle is the express purpose of the non-profit corporation. 
25. The individually listed defendants herein claim to hold shares of membership 
in the Association, which they have relinquished by signing a waiver instructing the Association 
to transfer the right to use the U.S. Forest Service permit to another Association member. In 
accordance with the transfer order, the right to use the U.S. Forest Service permit has been 
transferred by the Association to other members; however, the Association did not transfer the 
necessary shares of membership to the transferee. 
26. Such transfers are not permitted by the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. 
27. The Bylaws specifically require U.S. Forest Service permit ownership as a 
condition of membership. 
4 
28. Plaintiff believes that the shares tied to permit ownership should have been 
transferred to the member holding the right to run the cattle on the U.S. Forest Service permit 
owned by the Association. 
29. In the alternative, the interests held by members which no longer hold the right 
to run cattle should be cancelled. 
30. The non-profit Association has not been able to reach an amicable resolution 
to the dispute as to shares and permit ownership. 
31. Therefore, plaintiff seeks judgment from the Court determining membership in 
the Association and the amount of shares held. 
32. Without such a determination, the members will continue to divide the use of 
the assets of the corporation, including, but not limited to, loading chutes, corrals, and the 
private land, between classes of members that do not exist in the Articles or Bylaws. 
33. Plaintiff further seeks judgment establishing that the assets of the corporation 
are owned by the corporation and cannot be used solely by some of the members of the 
Association. 
COUNTH 
(Breach of Contract) 
34. Plaintiff realleges all previous allegations of this complaint. 
35. As a member of the Association, plaintiff is entitled to run his cattle on the 
Association's private land. 
5 
36. The Association has prohibited this action by illegal and/or improper vote. 
37. This breach of the plaintiffs rights has caused damage to the plaintiff. 
38. The breach includes, but is not limited to: 
a. Two months feed for 341 cattle at $15.00 per month per head. 
b. Additional transport costs of $10.00 per head. 
c. Additional labor. 
d. Loss of use of corrals and loading chutes. 
e. Loss of proper income distribution, including hunting revenue. 
f. Depreciation on the value of the cattle at approximately $20.00 per 
head. 
39. Damages to be proven at trial exceed $20,000.00. 
40. Plaintiff should be entitled to interest, costs and attorney fees. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that the Court issue the following relief: 
1. Declaratory judgment establishing the ownership interest of each member in the 
Association. 
2. Damages exceeding $20,000.00 in an amount to be proven at trial. 
3. Interest, costs and attorney fees for pursuing this action. 
6 
4. Such other relief as the Court deems proper and necessary. 
DATED this IB- day of January, 2001 
SEAN M PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Address: 
P. O. Box 75 
Goshen, UT 84633 
7 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this < o day of January, 2001. 
Joseph Dunbeck, Esq. 
123 South Main St., #1 
Heber City, UT 84032 
VCi&x&a ChzTiXP^. 
SECRETARY 
I:\SMP\OKEL8RY.COM 
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Exhibit E 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RAY OKELBERRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
WEST DANIELS LAND 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation, 
DAN WRIGHT, STEVE BETHERS, 
ELDON WRIGHT, JOHN 
BESSENDORFER, JAMES MORONI 
BESSENDORFER, BOB 
GAPPMAYER, and MRS BONNER 
NELSON, 
Defendants 
CASE NUMBER 990500174 
DATED MAY 21, 2001 
RULING 
ANTHONY W SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court on defendant West Daniels Land Association's 
motion to dismiss plaintiffs amended complaint I grant in part and deny m part the 
motion 
FACTUAL SETTING AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1 Plaintiff Ray Okelberry ("Okleberry") is a member of the defendant West 
Daniels Land Association (the "association"), incorporated in October 1952 
2 The association was established "for the purpose to hold and own and 
manage grazing land for the purpose of grazing animals as shall be determined by 
1 
the board of directors of said corporation " Affidavit of Incorporation, % 1 
3. The grazing areas used by the association include United States Forest 
Service lands as well as privately owned land. Members can graze cattle which they 
own on either of these lands provided they possess the appropriate grazing permit. 
4. According to the affidavit (articles) of incorporation, "each share of 
stock may cast one vote," and "two shares shall be issued for each head of 
livestock." Affidavit of Incorporation, ^ 2. The articles of incorporation do not 
expressly state that members must own a grazing permit in order to own stock. 
5. According to the bylaws, "each permittee member in good standing shall 
be entitled to one vote for each grazing head.'- Bylaws, Article XIII, Section 2. 
The bylaws were prepared in the name "West Daniels Cattle Association " The 
bylaws are undated but are signed by many individuals, many of whom also signed 
the affidavit of incorporation. 
6. Despite the language of the articles of incorporation, until very recently 
the association members have always voted based on number of cattle grazed. 
7. Beginning in 1981, some members of the association began selling their 
grazing permits but retained their stock in the association Okleberry purchased 
some of those grazing permits but was not issued any stock in the association l 
8. The members continued to cast votes based on number of cattle until 
recently when, for the first time, the association conducted a vote based on shares 
1
 This did not bother him at the time because the voting presumably was proceeding 
according to the number of head of cattle. 
2 
^ *J~ 
owned, not head of cattle. 
9. Okleberry complained that this new method of voting unfairly diluted his 
vote and he brought this suit, alleging two causes of action. First, Okleberry sought 
declaratory judgment establishing the proper method of voting, and determining 
that the association members who sold their grazing permits must relinquish or 
forfeit their shares. Second, he alleged a breach of contract, claiming that his 
contractual rights under the Bylaws were being violated. . 
10. On August 13, 1999, the association moved for partial summary 
judgment seeking to dismiss Okleberry's declaratory judgment cause of action. The 
motion was granted on January 5, 2000. 
11. On February 10, 2000, the association moved for summary judgment 
seeking to dispose of Okleberry's second cause of action on the basis that the 
January 5, 2000 ruling rendered his second claim lifeless. 
12. Before ruling on this motion, the court gave Okleberry leave to file an 
amended complaint, which he ultimately did. 
13. The amended complaint reasserts what had been the second cause of 
action (the contract claim) set forth in the original complaint. In addition, the 
amended complaint restated the declaratory judgment claim that had been rejected 
by the court on January 5, 2000, the justification being that the court's January 5, 
2000 ruling never addressed the issue of whether the articles of incorporation place 
any restrictions on stock ownership. 
14. Defendants now bring this motion seeking dismissal of plaintiffs 
3 
amended complaint 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
The association moves to dismiss the amended complaint, advancing several 
arguments First, the amended complaint fails to state a claim for relief as the 
court, in its January 5, 2000 ruling, already decided that there are no preconditions 
to stock ownership. Second, the articles of incorporation do not contain any 
preconditions to stock ownership, such as grazing permits or cattle Further, the 
articles of incorporation trump anything contained in the bylaws that might suggest 
otherwise. As a result, the association argues that the revived declaratory judgment 
claim has no merit and must be dismissed. It concludes that the second cause of 
action for breach of contract consequently must fall like a domino 
I conclude that all but paragraph 33 of the declaratory judgment claim must 
be dismissed. On a motion to dismiss, in order to determine whether a claim has 
been stated, a court must accept as true all of the well plead factual allegations of 
the complaint, including those appearing in the exhibits attached to the complaint2 
See Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah App 1994) 
Although the complaint alleges that the articles of incorporation impose 
restrictions on stock ownership, these allegations are not "well plead" factual 
assertions because Okelberry's own attachments (copies of the articles and bylaws) 
2
 See Beam v IPCO, 838 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir 1988) ("under Rule 12(b) the 
district court is entitled to consider exliibits attached to the complaint as part of the pleadings ") 
4 
preclude the existence of such restrictions.3 Okelberry's strained contention that 
the corporate purpose, or the method of initial stock distribution, impose conditions 
to stock ownership is unsupported by the plain language of the document. While it 
is arguable that the bylaws require cattle and grazing permit ownership, such bylaws 
would plainly be contrary to the articles of incorporation and are void as a matter of 
general corporate law.4 Thus, the complaint and attached documents could never 
support, even in the best of cases, the position that the governing corporate 
documents impose the preconditions to stock ownership which Okleberry asserts.D 
Interestingly, in paragraph 33 Okleberry raises an issue that does not depend 
upon membership or voting rights for determination: how the association is using 
its corporate assets. That paragraph raises a factual claim as to which the foregoing 
analysis does not apply. I conclude that paragraph 33 states a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. I grant the motion to dismiss the first claim for relief except I 
deny the motion to dismiss as to paragraph 33. 
3
 The amended complaint says that the articles and bylaws are attached. Perhaps by 
oversight, they are not. However, I consider them attached for four reasons: 1) they were 
attached to the original complaint, 2) they plainly were intended to be attached to the amended 
complaint, 3) the court is well aware of the documents as they were the subject of the first motion 
for summary judgment, and 4) it is the parties' desire that I look at these documents and constme 
their content. 
4
 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-6-44, 16-10a-206 which state that bylaws may contain any 
provision no inconsistent with law or the articles of incorporation. 
5
 The court's earlier ruling described the question then to be decided as "whether the 
articles of incorporation govern voting and membership in the corporation or whether the bylaws 
govern." This is a clear statement that the earlier ruling addressed both the issue of voting and 
the issue of membership. The doctrine of law of the case prohibits the court from addressing 
them again. 
5 
I also deny the motion to dismiss the second claim for relief Although a 
bylaw in contradiction with the articles of incorporation is invalid and ultra vires as 
a matter of general corporate law, Utah courts currently subscribe to the doctrine 
that an invalid bylaw may be enforceable on basic contract principals See McKee v 
Williams, 741 P 2d 978, 981-82 (Utah App 1987) (' Under the foregoing analysis, 
article 12 of the bylaws was perhaps invalid as a matter of general corporate law 
[but] [a]s a matter of contract law, several material issues of fact exist which 
preclude entry of partial summary judgment")6 Where the case law governing this 
doctrine has not been briefed by the parties, I deny the present motion with respect 
to the second cause of action 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, defendants' 
counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order 
Dated this ]£/_ day of May, 2001 
6
 Also, as stated in this court's January 5, 2000 ruling a disputed fact ma} exist as to 
whetlier the grazing permits are in fact a precondition set forth m the bylaws - that issue therefore 
needs further development 
6 
\ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this 21st day of May, 2001: 
Don Petersen 
Sean Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
P O Box 1248 
Provo, UT 84603 
Joseph Dunbeck 
51 West Center Street 
Heber City, UT 84032 
CARMA BUSH 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
By <^0W^YUl&Vl 
Deodfy Clerk 
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